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Part I: Introduction 
 Since the United States initiated its military response to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th, 2001, law and respect for legal rights has remained a focal point of 
legitimacy.  No single issue, however, has dominated the legal debate.  Instead, like 
Republican candidates for the presidential nomination, different issues have risen to 
discourse dominance, only to recede as other issues displaced them.  Was the invasion 
of Afghanistan justified?  What was the status of captured Taliban and al Qaeda 
operatives?  What techniques were permissible to interrogate these detainees?  Did the 
detainees have a right to judicial review?  Was the invasion of Iraq justified?  Was the 
response to detainee abuses in Iraq sufficient?  What was the scope of the armed conflict 
with al Qaeda, and who was included within the scope of that conflict?  What were the 
limits on the use of remotely piloted drones to attack alleged terrorist operatives?  
Could that attack authority extend to U.S. citizens? 
 All of these issues have involved the complex intersection of national security 
policy and domestic and international law, and many of them continue to vex policy 
makers.  However, almost like constancy of Mitt Romney, the one issue has maintained 
consistent prominence throughout this period is the legality of long-term preventive 
detention of alleged enemy belligerents.  Indeed, the detention facility established at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was from inception and remains to this day a lightening rod of 
legal controversy. 
 The most recent manifestation of this controversy came in the form of the long-
term detention provisions of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act.  While much 
ink has been spilt on the fundamental question of preventive detention of U.S. citizens 
brought to the surface by these provisions, the procedural mandates included within 
the provisions received less attention.  Leaving aside the basic question of substantive 
detention authority, the provision for a right to legal representation for individuals 
subjected to detention is perhaps the most profound shift in detention policy since 
September 11th.  Since the inception of the U.S. preventive detention program, there has 
been an ongoing effort to enhance the detention review process.  Some of these 
enhancements have been motivated by the Supreme Court’s detainee jurisprudence; 
others most likely from the recognition that it is ultimately counter-productive to detain 
individuals who may have been captured in a broad net but who in fact pose no 
significant threat to the United States or coalition partners.  Regardless of the 
motivation, it is simply beyond dispute that the process utilized today to review the 
detainability of captured personnel is far more protective than that originally adopted 
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by the United States (which, to be fair, is in part the result of the bare minimalist 
approach originally implemented by the Bush Administration). 
 One procedural protection has, however, been consistently absent from this 
progression: provision of legal representation for the detainee review process.  
Ostensibly based on an analogy to the tribunal provided to individuals contesting their 
designation as prisoners of war (the so called ‘Article 5 Tribunal’), detainees are instead 
provided with a lay military officer to serve as their personal representative.  In 
contrast, since the Secretary of Defense first ordered the creation of the Combatant 
Status Review Tribunal in 2004 to review the status of Guantanamo detainees, the 
government has always been represented by military attorneys, or JAG officers.   
 This lay-representation paradigm has finally been called into question.  The 
extremely controversial provisions of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act 
authorizing preventive military detention of U.S. and alien terrorist operatives includes, 
for the first time, a mandate to provide detainees with legal representation during 
detention review proceedings.  The law, signed into law by President Obama on 
December 19, 2011, provides in Section 1036 that the Secretary of Defense must submit 
to Congress within 90 days of enactment a report “setting forth the procedures for 
determining the status of persons captured in the course of hostilities authorized by the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40) for purposes of section 
1031.”  The law then provides, inter alia, that “[A]n unprivileged enemy belligerent may, 
at the election of the belligerent, be represented by military counsel at proceedings for 
the determination of status of the belligerent.” 
 
 It is not yet clear at what point in the detention process this military counsel 
requirement will become operative.  According to the Conference Report on this 
provision of the NDAA:  
The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec. 1036) that would 
require the Secretary of Defense to establish procedures for determining 
the status of persons captured in the course of hostilities authorized by the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107–40), including 
access to a military judge and a military lawyer for an enemy belligerent 
who will be held in longterm detention. The House bill contained no 
similar provision.  
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The House recedes with an amendment clarifying that the Secretary of 
Defense is not required to apply the procedures for long-term detention in 
the case of a person for whom habeas corpus review is available in federal 
court.  Because this provision is prospective, the Secretary of Defense is 
authorized to determine the extent, if any, to which such procedures will 
be applied to detainees for whom status determinations have already been 
made prior to the date of the enactment of this Act.  The conferees expect 
that the procedures issued by the Secretary of Defense will define 
what constitutes ‘‘long-term’’ detention for the purposes of subsection (b). 
The conferees understand that under current Department of Defense 
practice in Afghanistan, a detainee goes before a Detention Review Board 
for a status determination 60 days after capture, and again 6 months after 
that.  The Department of Defense has considered extending the period of 
time before a second review is required. The conferees expect that the 
procedures required by subsection (b) would not be triggered by the first 
review, but could be triggered by the second review, in the discretion of 
the Secretary.  
Thus, legal representation will now turn on the definition of “long-term.”  Nonetheless, 
this is an important step forward in the procedural protections afforded individuals 
subjected to wartime preventive detention; and, in the opinion of the authors, long 
overdue.  Whatever the ultimate triggering point definition that emerges, the detention 
review process will undoubtedly be enhanced by this provision.  While no amount of 
process will ameliorate the concerns of critics of the fundamental concept of applying 
wartime preventive detention to counter-terror operations, even the most ardent of such 
critics must acknowledge that providing representatives trained in the lawyer ethos of 
zealous representation is a marked improvement to the lay representation model 
currently utilized. 
 This provision, and the fact that it has taken a decade to impose such a 
representation requirement, calls into question the legitimacy of subjecting non-
traditional captives to preventive detention without legal representation.  Can a 
detention review system that relies on lay military officers to represent the interests of 
alleged belligerent operatives ever be considered legitimate?  While it is clear that the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel jurisprudence of the Supreme Court is inapposite to 
these non-criminal detention proceedings, it is the thesis of this article that the 
underlying rationale of that jurisprudence indicates that the answer to this question is 
no, and that the imposition of a legal representation requirement is long overdue.   
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 The Supreme Court’s right to counsel jurisprudence has focused primarily on 
U.S. criminal justice (although as noted the Court has also recently addressed the 
significance of legal representation in the context of non-punitive detentions). However, 
since September 11th the preventive detention of alleged terrorist operatives and other 
unprivileged enemy belligerents in the context of what President Bush labeled the 
Global War on Terror has become the most significant focal point in the debate over the 
balance between government interests and individual liberty. Almost immediately after 
the United States unleashed its military power to detect and disable the terrorist threat, 
an entirely new preventive detention regime emerged: the detention of alleged 
unprivileged belligerents captured in the ongoing armed conflict with al Qaeda and 
other associated forces. This detention regime has generated perhaps more controversy 
than any other aspect of the ongoing struggle against the transnational terrorist threat, 
triggering an abundance of legal scholarship, commentary, and debate. It has also 
involved ongoing internal government efforts to refine the process for assessing which 
captives should be subjected to what is essentially indefinite detention. These efforts 
have been punctuated by judicial challenges and several critical Supreme Court 
decisions, as well as legislative efforts to provide greater clarity in the balance between 
government detention authority and individual interests. The net result has been both 
an endorsement of the government’s invocation of armed conflict-based preventive 
detention authority and imposition of limitations on the President’s authority to 
manage the detention process.  
 All of this has resulted in two undeniable realities: first, the assertion of authority 
based on the law of armed conflict to preventively detain captured terrorist belligerents 
is now firmly entrenched and unlikely to be reconsidered any time soon; second, the 
ever-growing recognition that this invocation will result in what Justice Kennedy 
characterized as “generational detention” has and will continue to produce pressure on 
the United States to ensure the accuracy and legitimacy of detention decisions. To this 
end, the government has made substantial advances in the process for assessing when a 
captured individual should be committed to indefinite military detention. These 
advances have impacted not only the several hundred detainees in Guantanamo Bay 
Cuba, but also the thousands of detainees held by the United States in Afghanistan. 
 These efforts to revise and improve the preventive detention process have 
produced significant modifications intended to protect captives from erroneous 
detention decisions. However, the lack of legal representation for detainees subject to 
the detention review process has remained unaltered since the initiation of the Global 
War on Terror. Relying ostensibly on a variety of justifications - including inter alia the 
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fact that not even lawful enemy combatants are afforded assistance of counsel to 
challenge their preventive detention under the Geneva Conventions and that the 
preventive nature of the detention in no way implicates the Sixth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution - the United States has steadfastly refused to provide captives such 
assistance at proceedings to determine whether they qualify for indefinite detention. 
Instead, in an obvious analogy to the process for determining POW status pursuant to 
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and the Army 
Regulation implementing that treaty, a non-legal representative is provided to assist the 
captive in contesting the legitimacy of the unlawful belligerent status determination 
and the preventive detention resulting from that characterization. 
 This article will question whether denying these captives legal representation is 
justified in light of the interests at stake in the detention review process. In so doing, it 
will consider the fundamental balance between the risks and consequences of error and 
the feasibility of providing such assistance implicated by the preventive detention 
process, and how this balance influences the ongoing conclusion that lay representation 
by a military office is justified by the nature of the preventive detention process. While 
acknowledging that wartime preventive detentions fall outside the scope of precedents 
like Powell and Gideon, the article will draw from underlying principles reflected in 
these decisions to question whether the lay representation by military officers is 
sufficient to effectively advance the interests implicated in this non-punitive preventive 
detention process. Finally, the article will consider the probable objections to providing 
legal representation to detainees to include the feasibility of doing so. 
 The article will begin, in Part II, with a discussion of the ethos of zealous 
representation and its significance in the U.S. legal culture.  Part III of this article will 
discuss the extension of traditional armed conflict based preventive detention to 
terrorist operatives following the September 11th terrorist attacks. Part III will then trace 
the evolution of detention procedures and the most recent efforts to improve the 
detention review process in Afghanistan. Part IV will discuss the theoretical foundation 
for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Part V will critically analyze the existing 
personal representative concept, and suggest why this concept is insufficient to render 
meaningful the procedural protections established to minimize the risk of erroneous 
detention decisions. Part VI will consider the feasibility of providing legal 
representation to individuals subject to indefinite detention as the result of being 
classified as unprivileged belligerents, and consider the inevitable objections to such a 
concept. Part VI will also consider how such representation may potentially impact 
subsequent judicial review required pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
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Boumediene v. Bush, as well as how it might contribute to limiting any extension of that 
decision to other detention environments. The article will conclude by suggesting that 
the balance of interests involved in the provision of legal representation should lead to a 
careful reassessment of the logic of clinging to the current detention review 
representation paradigm. 
Part II: The Lawyer Ethos and Zealous Representation 
 In 1932, the Supreme Court decided Powell v. Alabama, a case that arose out of 
one of the most disgraceful incidents in the sordid history of the Jim Crow era 
segregation in the southern United States. Nine African-American men had been 
summarily tried in an Alabama courtroom for the alleged rape of two Caucasian 
women: Ruby Bates and Victoria Price. Unsurprisingly, all were convicted based only 
on the testimony of the two alleged victims – testimony that would be seriously 
discredited in subsequent proceedings. Defendant Powell was sentenced to death. The 
Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, although one Justice 
dissented as the result of what he recognized was a total failure to afford the defendants 
due process of law.1 
                                                 
1 See Powell v. State, 141 So. 201, 214–15 (Anderson, C.J., dissenting) (1932), rev’d, Powell v. Alabama, 287 
U.S. 45 (1932). In his dissent, Chief Justice Anderson of the Alabama Supreme Court stated that the 
ultimate guilt or innocence of the defendants was immaterial if they were not afforded the process they 
were due at trial, and that the trial court should have ordered a new trial once public outrage had died 
down to ensure that the defendants had received a fair trial: 
Under the statute, the defendants being unable to employ counsel, it was the duty of the 
trial judge to appoint counsel . . . The court did not name or designate particular counsel, 
but appointed the entire Scottsboro bar, thus extending and enlarging the responsibility, 
and, in a sense, enabling each one to rely upon others . . . [while] we can appreciate the 
position of a lawyer appointed to defend an indigent defendant whom he may feel is 
guilty and as against whom public sentiment is at fever heat, the record indicates that the 
appearance was rather pro forma than zealous and active and which is indicated by a 
declination on the part of counsel to argue the case, notwithstanding the solicitor insisted 
upon the right to open and close, and the state did, in fact, have the benefit of two 
arguments and the defendants none. We, of course, realize that a defendant can 
sometimes gain an advantage by agreeing to submit a case without argument, as the state 
has the opening and closing, but, where there is no agreement and the solicitor or 
prosecutor makes two arguments and the counsel for defendant makes none, it is bound 
to make an unfavorable impression on the jury . . . As to whether or not these defendants 
are guilty is not a question of first importance, the real one being, Did they get a fair and 
impartial trial as contemplated by the bill of rights? . . . It may be that neither of the 
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 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether Powell 
had been denied due process of law in violation of the 14th Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. Powell attacked the Alabama trial process on three grounds. First, 
he argued that the summary nature of the process resulted in a denial of due process. 
Second, he argued that the exclusion of members of his race from the jury violated due 
process. Third, he argued that Alabama’s failure to provide meaningful assistance of 
counsel violated due process.2 
 In an opinion read today by virtually every law student at the outset of their 
study of federal criminal procedure, the Supreme Court struck down Powell’s 
conviction.3 The Justices coalesced around a clear and compelling premise: the trial 
without meaningful assistance of counsel fatally infected the proceedings and resulted 
in a violation of Powell’s constitutional right to due process. This one flaw in the trial 
process was of such magnitude that it rendered moot Powell’s alternate attacks, which 
                                                                                                                                                             
foregoing reasons [namely lack of zealous representation and consideration of the case 
by a biased jury], if standing alone should reverse these cases, but, when considered in 
connection with each other, they must collectively impress the judicial mind with the 
conclusion that these defendants did not get that fair and impartial trial that is required 
and contemplated by our Constitution. Therefore, in justice to the defendants and to the 
fair name of the state of Alabama, as well as the county of Jackson, these cases should be 
retried after some months of cooling time have elapsed and by their vigilant employed 
counsel. 
Id. Chief Justice Anderson went on to cite Alabama’s own precedent demanding fair trial in criticism of 
the trial court’s actions, noting how the nature of a particular crime obviates neither the defendants’ 
rights nor the trial court’s mandate to ensure those rights are properly protected: 
[T]he law should prevail, without any reference to the magnitude or brutality of the 
offense charged. No matter how revolting the accusation, how clear the proof, or how 
degraded, or even brutal, the offender, the Constitution, the law, the very genius of 
Anglo-American liberty, demand a fair and impartial trial. If guilty, let him suffer such 
penalty as an impartial jury, unawed by outside pressure, may under the law inflict upon 
him. He is a human being and is entitled to this. Let not an outraged public, or one which 
deems itself outraged, stain its own hands-stamp on its soul the sin of a great crime-on 
the false plea that it is but the avenger of the innocent.  
Id. at 215 (quoting Seay v. State, 93 So. 403, 405 (Ala. 1922)). 
 
2 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 50 (1932). 
 
3 See id. at 65. 
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the Court did not even address. The implication was clear: even if Powell was correct 
that the summary process and exclusion of African Americans from the jury violated 
due process, denial of zealous representation of counsel produced a pervasive infection 
to the entire process of such a magnitude that any other error would have been 
superfluous. Nor had the general “assistance of the bar” come even close to protecting 
Powell’s rights.4 Thus, the Supreme Court emphasized a simple yet compelling 
premise: that a lawyer for the defense, devoted to the cause of the client and committed 
to zealously represent that cause, is the true sine qua non of ensuring fundamental 
fairness and a just outcome in the criminal adjudicatory process. Powell, however, was 
limited to capital cases, a holding confirmed two decades later in Betts v. Brady.5 
 Three decades later the Court would once again address the relationship 
between zealous legal representation and fair process. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 
Petitioner Clarence Gideon challenged his conviction and incarceration resulting from a 
                                                 
4 The Supreme Court noted that while the trial court called for the local bar to assist the defendants, any 
such assistance rendered fell short of the defendants’ constitutional right to legal representation: 
[U]ntil the very morning of the trial no lawyer had been named or definitely designated 
to represent the defendants. Prior to that time, the trial judge had ‘appointed all the 
members of the bar’ for the limited ‘purpose of arraigning the defendants.’ Whether they 
would represent the defendants thereafter, if no counsel appeared in their behalf, was a 
matter of speculation only, or, as the judge indicated, of mere anticipation on the part of 
the court. Such a designation, even if made for all purposes, would, in our opinion, have 
fallen far short of meeting, in any proper sense, a requirement for the appointment of 
counsel. How many lawyers were members of the bar does not appear; but, in the very 
nature of things, whether many or few, they would not, thus collectively named, have 
been given that clear appreciation of responsibility or impressed with that individual 
sense of duty which should and naturally would accompany the appointment of a 
selected member of the bar, specifically named and assigned. 
Id. at 56. 
 
5 316 U.S. 455, 464, 473 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1973) (considering 
whether “due process of law demands that in every criminal case, whatever the circumstances, a state 
must furnish counsel to an indigent defendant” and whether “the furnishing of counsel in all cases . . . 
dictated by natural, inherent, and fundamental principles of fairness” and holding that the Sixth 
Amendment possesses no “inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly 
conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel.” The Supreme Court thus 
declined to fully incorporate the Sixth Amendment against the States, preferring to allow each State to 
legislate which situations guarantee a right to appointed counsel and which do not). 
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trial at which his request for an appointed defense counsel had been denied based on 
Florida law.6 Gideon had, of course, been afforded the right to secure his own attorney, 
but when he informed the court that he was indigent and could not afford counsel, he 
was told that he would have to defend himself against the District Attorney.7 However, 
Gideon was not facing capital punishment, and as a result Powell’s holding did not 
require Florida to appoint counsel for defendants like Gideon; at the time, Florida and 
several other states did not provide indigent defendants with counsel in non-capital 
criminal trials. Gideon’s petition was received by the Supreme Court in formas pauperas, 
and the Court appointed Abe Fortas to advocate Gideon’s cause.8  
The issue presented to the Court was more significant than the right to be 
represented by counsel; it was whether the failure of the government to provide such 
representation to indigent defendants fatally undermined the legitimacy of the criminal 
adjudicatory process and thereby violated Gideon’s 14th Amendment right to due 
process. During his argument before the Court, Fortas noted:  
Without [counsel], how can a civilized nation pretend that it is having a 
fair trial, under our adversary system, which means that counsel for the 
State will do his best within the limits of fairness and honor and decency 
to present the case for the State, and counsel for the defense will do his 
best, similarly, to present the best case possible for the defendant, and 
from that clash there will emerge the truth. That is our concept, and how 
                                                 
6 372 U.S. at 338. 
 
7 The following exchange occurred at the trial court and was memorialized in the Supreme Court’s 
opinion: 
The COURT: Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, but I cannot appoint Counsel to represent you in 
this case. Under the laws of the State of Florida, the only time the Court can appoint 
Counsel to represent a Defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense. I 
am sorry, but I will have to deny your request to appoint Counsel to defend you in this 
case. 
The DEFENDANT: The United States Supreme Court says I am entitled to be represented 
by Counsel. 
Id. at 336. 
 
8 See Abe Krash, Architects of Gideon: Remembering Abe Fortas and Hugo Black, THE CHAMPION: 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS (March 1998), available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/Champion/Articles/98mar02.htm (last visited November 30, 2011). 
 
11 
 
can we say, how can it be suggested that a court is properly constituted, 
that a trial is fair, unless those conditions exist.9  
 
Gideon prevailed on his challenge, and the Court’s decision extended Powell’s logic to 
any criminal defendant.10 Once again, the message was clear: the zealous legal 
representation for an accused is essential to ensuring the fundamental fairness of 
criminal process. 
                                                 
9 See Gideon v. Wainwright – Oral Argument, Part 1, available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-
1969/1962/1962_155 (last visited Dec. 15, 2011). 
 
10 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (holding that counsel must be appointed in any case 
resulting in a sentence of actual imprisonment unless the defendant knowingly and intelligently). The 
Court declined to create different rules for felonies, misdemeanors, and petty offenses, noting that “[t]he 
requirement of counsel may well be necessary for a fair trial even in a petty-offense prosecution,” 
reasoning that  
legal and constitutional questions involved in a case that actually leads to imprisonment 
even for a brief period are any less complex than when a person can be sent off for six 
months or more . . . We must conclude, therefore, that the problems associated with 
misdemeanor and petty offenses often require the presence of counsel to insure the 
accused a fair trial . . . Under the rule we announce today, every judge will know when 
the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, even though 
local law permits it, unless the accused is represented by counsel. He will have a measure 
of the seriousness and gravity of the offense and therefore know when to name a lawyer 
to represent the accused before the trial starts. 
 Id. at 33, 36, 40. But see Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (holding that counsel does not need to be 
appointed if the defendant was convicted but not sentenced to any term of imprisonment). The Court, 
noting a distinction between imprisonment as an authorized and threatened possible penalty and 
imprisonment actually assessed as a penalty, concluded: 
[T]he central premise of Argersinger—that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in 
kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment—is eminently sound and warrants 
adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to 
appointment of counsel . . . We therefore hold that the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent criminal 
defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the 
right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense. 
Id. at 373–74. 
 
12 
 
 In a subsequent decision, the Supreme Court held that the Gideon right to  
counsel provided at government expense is triggered by any sentence that includes 
even one day of incarceration.11 Rejecting a misdemeanor/felony dichotomy and 
drawing a trigger point at the sentences to incarceration, and not at the nature of the 
offense, indicated the Court’s recognition that it is the consequence of government 
action, and not necessarily the label, that implicates this fundamental right.12 In another 
line of decisions, the Court also held that even when a defendant is represented at trial, 
failure of counsel to provide effective representation results in constitutional error.13 It 
has therefore become axiomatic that zealous representation of counsel is an essential 
component to the criminal adjudication process. Nor has the importance of counsel 
been limited to the criminal incarceration context. In United States v. Salerno, the 
Supreme Court upheld the preventive detention authority established by Congress in 
the Bail Reform Act of 1984,14 relying in large measure on the Act’s provision for an 
adversarial hearing in which the suspect is represented by counsel.15  
                                                 
11 See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40. 
 
12 Id. 
 
13 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (holding that the fact that “a person who happens 
to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused . . . is not enough to satisfy the constitutional 
command.” Instead, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment “envisions counsel’s playing a role that is 
critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results . . . An accused is entitled to be 
assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure that the 
trial is fair”). Strickland also set down the requirements for a successful ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim. See generally id. at 689–96 (discussing the elements for a court to hold that counsel provided 
ineffective assistance and thus effectively denied the defendant his constitutional right to counsel). 
 
14 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (holding that “the provisions for pretrial detention in the Bail 
Reform Act of 1984 fall within th[e] carefully limited exception [of detention prior to trial or without 
trial],” because the Act’s detention authority requires “[an] adversary hearing [showing that the accused] 
. . . pose[s] a threat to the safety of individuals or to the community which no condition of release can 
dispel” and that the Act contains “numerous procedural safeguards . . . [which] must [be] attend[ed at] 
this adversary hearing” before the accused can be detained). 
 
15 See 18 U. S. C. § 3142(e), (f)(2) (allowing a judicial officer to order the detention of the accused before 
trial if “no condition or combination of conditions [set out in § (c)] will reasonably assure the appearance 
of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community,” and further requiring a 
hearing before making such determination. Section (f) provides the circumstances under which a hearing 
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 Part I: Terrorism, Armed Conflict, and Preventive Detention 
A.  Detention of Combatants and the Global War on Terror 
 
 Since the inception of what President Bush called the “Global War on Terror,” it 
has become apparent that the United States considers the preventive detention of 
captured enemy belligerents a fundamental incident of armed conflict authorized by 
customary international law.16 This is a clear departure from the law of peace.17 While 
U.S. jurisprudence has established several very limited situations in which preventive 
detention is lawful outside the context of armed conflict,18 due process normally 
requires prompt charge and trial to justify a deprivation of liberty outside the armed 
conflict context.19 In the armed conflict context, however, preventive detention is an 
                                                                                                                                                             
must be held and the rights of the accused at that hearing; rights include “the right to be represented by 
counsel, and, if financially unable to obtain adequate representation, to have counsel appointed.” Id. at § 
(f)(2)).   
 
16 See, e.g., Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 62 (D.D.C. 2009), abrogated by Uthman v. Obama, 637 
F.3d 400 D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (hereinafter 
“AUMF”) authorized the President of the United States to detain members of the non-national 
organizations named in the AUMF). 
 
17 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 (“Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of 
active hostilities”) (hereinafter “GPW”). 
 
18 See, e.g., Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750 (holding that the individual’s strong interest in and right to liberty 
“may, in circumstances where the government’s interest is sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to the 
greater needs of society,” but also expressing that the extensive safeguards for the accused built in to the 
Bail Reform Act and the hearing requirement prior to detention were sufficient to defend the Act against 
a facial challenge to constitutionality). 
 
19 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (holding that post-indictment, pretrial preventive 
detention under the Bail Reform Act did not violate the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause nor the 
Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (holding that “a 
citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the 
factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions 
before a neutral decisionmaker”). 
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action justified by the principle of military necessity, a customary international law 
norm that permits belligerents to take all measures not otherwise prohibited by 
international law necessary to bring about the prompt submission of an opponent.20 
 
 Depriving captured enemy belligerents the opportunity to return to hostilities 
is certainly necessary to defeat an enemy.21 Nonetheless, there is contemporary debate 
related to whether preventative detention authority is the same in both international 
and non-international armed conflicts. Several treaties, including most importantly, the 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW)22 (which 
regulates the treatment of certain categories of detained combatants and civilians acting 
on behalf of enemy States in an international armed conflict) are clearly founded upon 
an international consensus that States have the legal authority to detain such 
individuals. However, neither customary nor treaty law involving the LOAC provide 
clear authority related to the detention of enemy belligerents in the context of non-
international armed conflicts. As a result, some experts assert that domestic statutory 
authority is required to legally justify preventive detention in this context, even while 
conceding such detention is consistent with the principle of military necessity.23 
                                                 
20 See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE para. 3 (July 1956) 
(hereinafter “FM 27-10”). 
 
21 See, e.g., Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 279 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated by Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 
S.Ct. 1545 (2009) (holding that while Congress may have given the President the authority to detain 
petitioner as an enemy combatant, petitioner had been given insufficient process to challenge his 
detention). 
 
22 See generally GPW, supra note 17. 
 
23 See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2010). Petitioners’ argument rejected the 
government’s status-based detention scheme as well as its authority to preventatively detain in a NIAC: 
[Petitioners insist] that detention based solely on membership in an organization such as 
al Qaeda is completely antithetical to the law of war. Such an approach is prohibited by 
the law of war, the argument goes, because it represents detention based on status rather 
than conduct, which is impermissible in the context of the current non-international 
armed conflict. Petitioners also contend that status-based detentions ignore the 
distinction between combatants and civilians in traditional international armed conflicts. 
In their view, that distinction – which is fundamental to the law of war – leads to the 
conclusion that the only persons who are detainable in the current armed conflict are 
“individuals who were lawful combatants under Article 4 of the Geneva Conventions 
(members of an armed force of a State or other militia as described in Article 4), and 
15 
 
Pursuant to this legal interpretation, preventive detention of a non-state belligerent 
absent such domestic statutory authority is inherently arbitrary.24 
                                                                                                                                                             
civilians who become unlawful combatants by reason of their direct participation in 
hostilities as that standard is understood in international law.” As a practical matter, 
then, the only individuals who would be detainable under petitioners’ framework are 
civilians who directly participate in hostilities (i.e., individuals who would be detainable 
based upon their conduct, not their status), because by definition no “lawful combatants” 
fight on behalf of the enemy in the current non-international armed conflict. 
Id. at 70–71 (citations omitted). While the D.C. Circuit rejected several of these claims (citing the Geneva 
Conventions), it did state that the line beyond which the government could not detain legally under 
either international law or the AUMF was demarcated by the difference between membership in 
associated forces and providing “substantial support” to those forces: 
In addition to members of al Qaeda and the Taliban, the government's detention 
authority also reaches those who were members of ‘associated forces.’ For purposes of 
these habeas proceedings, the Court interprets the term ‘associated forces’ to mean ‘co-
belligerents’ as that term is understood under the law of war . . . [However,] [d]etaining 
an individual who ‘substantially supports’ such an organization, but is not part of it, is 
simply not authorized by the AUMF itself or by the law of war. Hence, the government’s 
reliance on ‘substantial support’ as a basis for detention independent of membership in 
the Taliban, al Qaeda or an associated force is rejected. 
Id. at 74–76. 
 
24 See generally Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military 
Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1084–87 (2008) (discussing the Geneva Convention criteria 
applicable to finding that a detainee deserves POW treatment, and asserting that while the “laws of war 
also provide for military detention or preventive internment during non-international armed conflicts 
(NIACs),” there are no explicit detention criteria for NIACs (as opposed to those for IACs), and the only 
bright-line rule applicable to NIAC detainees appears in Common Article 3, and in certain articles of the 
First and Second Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions; however, the United States is not a 
party to the Additional Protocols so any authority thereby would be customary international law or non-
binding (the position of the United States government). See also Jody M. Prescott, Detention Status Review 
Process in Transnational Armed Conflict: Al Maqaleh v. Gates and the Parwan Detention Facility, 5 U. MASS. 
ROUNDTABLE SYMP. L.J. 5, 25–26 (2010). Prescott describes the U.S. policy decision to apply a domestic 
military regulation, AR 190-8 to all detainees regardless of the type of conflict they were captured in, and 
considers the concern that even this step, which grants protections to so-called unlawful enemy 
combatants, still falls short of the humanitarian baseline encouraged by some critics of U.S. detention 
policy: 
For detainees held in non-international armed conflicts, Common Article 3 of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions sets the baseline for physical treatment but does not specify how 
detainee status should be determined or reviewed. As a matter of implementing U.S. 
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 The United States follows a different interpretation of the law, relying on the 
customary LOAC principle of military necessity to justify the detention of enemy 
belligerents in any armed conflict, even absent a treaty or statute expressly authorizing 
preventive detention.25 This legal basis for the entire unprivileged belligerent detention 
regime is based on a seminal World War II era Supreme Court precedent – the principal 
authority relied on by the Supreme Court when it endorsed the President Bush’s 
invocation of preventive detention authority to incapacitate captured al Qaeda and 
Taliban personnel.26 
 
B.   The U.S. Legal Foundation for Preventive Detention of Enemy  
    Belligerents 
 
 The 1942 Supreme Court decision Ex parte Quirin27 reviewed the legality of the 
trial by secret military commission of nine German saboteurs. The defendants had been 
arrested by the FBI after landing on Long Island and Florida, and dispersing to cities in 
                                                                                                                                                             
policy, the decision to apply AR 190-8 to all detainees regardless of the nature of the 
conflict provides for an expansion in the humanitarian treatment afforded by Common 
Article 3. Practically, this is consistent with the aim of the theory of transnational armed 
conflict, but some might argue that this expands the scope of armed conflict beyond what 
international humanitarian treaty law, and possibly customary law, allows. Accordingly, 
some might argue that the process afforded under AR 190-8, although greater than that 
expected under international law in cases of international armed conflict, is not sufficient 
from an international human rights law perspective for the detention of individuals who 
are believed to be a part of al Qaeda. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 
25 Francis Lieber defined military necessity as “those measures which are indispensible for securing the 
ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.” U.S. War 
Department, General Order No. 100 (Apr. 24, 1863). More recently, the United States has defined military 
necessity as “that principle which justifies those measures not forbidden by international law which are 
indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible.” FM 27-10, supra 
note 3, at para. 3(a). 
 
26 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 
27 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
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the United States.28 Selected by the German intelligence service because of their 
proficiency in English and U.S. dialects, the defendants were all members of the 
German armed forces trained to conduct sabotage missions.29 After coming ashore from 
a German U-Boat, they immediately discarded their uniforms and proceeded to various 
locations within the United States ostensibly to execute their sabotage missions.30 
 
 All of the saboteurs were quickly apprehended by the FBI.31 Although the 
Department of Justice began the process to bring them to trial in federal court, President 
Roosevelt chose instead to order trial by a secret military commission on war crimes.32 
The commission was convened by order of the President, and the saboteurs were all 
charged with violations of the laws and customs of war, including espionage and 
operating as unlawful belligerents.33 
 
 The German defendants challenged the legality of trial by military commission 
by writ of habeas corpus to the Supreme Court.34 In a per curium opinion, the Court 
                                                 
28 See id. at 21. 
 
29 See id. 
 
30 See id. 
 
31 See id.  
 
32 See id. at 22–23. Roosevelt ordered trial by military commission because he “feared that [the saboteurs] 
would not be punished severely enough in an Article III court.” Carlissa Carson, Yes We Can Revise the 
Current Military Commission System, But Why?, 25 CONN. J. INT’L L. 389, 399 (2010). 
 
33 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 22–23.  
 
34 See id. at 20. The German defendants argued 
that the President is without any statutory or constitutional authority to order 
the petitioners to be tried by military tribunal for offenses with which they are 
charged; that in consequence they are entitled to be tried in the civil courts with 
the safeguards, including trial by jury, which the Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
guarantee to all persons charged in such courts with criminal offenses. In any 
case it is urged that the President's Order, in prescribing the procedure of the 
Commission and the method for review of its findings and sentence, and the 
proceedings of the Commission under the Order, conflict with Articles of War 
adopted by Congress . . . and are illegal and void. 
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denied the writ and held that the military commission had lawful jurisdiction to try the 
saboteurs.35 The Court held that, as enemy belligerents, the defendants were subject to 
the laws and customs of war.36 More importantly, the invocation of this law was 
justified by the state of war between Germany and the United States, providing the 
source of authority for the capture, detention, and trial of the defendants.37  
 
 Although the Quirin decision focused primarily on the legality of trial by 
military commission, it also addressed preventive detention authority. According to the 
Court:  
 
By universal agreement and practice the law of war draws a 
distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful 
populations of belligerent nations and also between those 
who are lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful 
combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners 
of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are 
likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition 
they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals 
for acts which render their belligerency unlawful.38  
                                                                                                                                                             
Id. at 24. 
 
35 Id. at 24. 
 
36 Id. at 37. 
 
37 See id. at 31. The Court discussed unlawful belligerents, such as saboteurs, and discussed their rights 
under the law of armed conflict in the following manner:  
The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent in 
time of war, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the enemy, or 
an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the 
purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property, are familiar examples of 
belligerents who are generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, 
but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by military 
tribunals. 
Id. 
  
38 Id. at 30–31.  
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The Supreme Court therefore did not consider statutory detention authority necessary 
to justify the preventive detention of captured enemy belligerents, instead relying on 
the customary law of war. Perhaps even more important for the events that transpired 
after September 11, 2001, the Court clearly considered this authority applicable to 
captured enemy belligerents irrespective of whether they qualified as ‘lawful’ 
combatants (captured enemy belligerent personnel qualified for status as prisoners of 
war pursuant to the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War).39  
 Soon after initiation of American military action against Taliban and al Qaida 
forces in Afghanistan following the terror attacks of September 11th, the U.S. military 
began detaining Taliban and al Qaeda operatives. Many captives were subsequently 
transferred to the newly established Military Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay 
Naval Base in Cuba. Military Order No. 1, issued by President Bush in November 2001, 
included a directive to establish this facility for the detention of “unlawful alien enemy 
combatants.”40 Accordingly, U.S. nationals were excluded from the category of captured 
personnel subject to detention at Guantanamo; however, they were not excluded from 
the broader scope of unlawful combatant detention. The United States soon learned that 
one captive who had been transferred from Afghanistan to Guantanamo, Yaser Esam 
Hamdi, had been born in the United States and was therefore a U.S. citizen. This 
knowledge did not result in his release or transfer to civilian custody for purposes of 
trial by federal court. Instead, his preventive detention continued, but only after he was 
immediately transferred to a military confinement facility in the United States.  
 Hamdi’s father successfully petitioned the courts by writ of habeas corpus filed 
as a “next friend” on behalf of his son. The challenge culminated with the Supreme 
Court decision of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.41 Invoking Quirin, the Supreme Court endorsed 
Hamdi’s continued preventive detention as an enemy belligerent.42 Although the Court 
                                                 
39 See infra pp. 17–20. 
 
40 Military Order of November 13, 2001 – Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the 
War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 § 3(a) (2001) (hereinafter “Military Order No. 1”). 
 
41 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 
42 Id. at 519, 520 (“There is no bar to this Nation’s holding one of its own citizens as an enemy combatant” 
. . . “[c]itizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, 
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also held that Hamdi was entitled to more meaningful procedural protections than had 
been afforded by the Executive Branch, it rejected the assertion that Hamdi’s detention 
was unlawful because he had not been captured in the context of a formally declared 
war against a state enemy. Instead, because Hamdi had been captured in the context of 
an armed conflict prosecuted by the President with the statutory support of Congress 
(in the form of the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force against those 
responsible for the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 or “AUMF”),43 and had been 
engaged in hostilities against U.S. and Coalition forces, Hamdi was legally 
indistinguishable from the defendants in Quirin.44 According to the Court: 
 In light of these principles, it is of no moment that the 
AUMF does not use specific language of detention. Because 
detention to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is 
a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use 
of “necessary and appropriate force,” Congress has clearly 
and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow 
circumstances considered here. 45 
Earlier in the opinion, the Court emphasized that the “principles” and customs it 
referenced in the extract quoted above were the principles derived from the law of war 
                                                                                                                                                             
guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning 
of . . . the law of war”).  
 
43 Authorization for Use of Military Force, P.L. 107-40 (S.J.Res. 23), 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001). The 
AUMF was a congressional mandate stating that 
the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or 
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such 
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism 
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons. 
Id. at § 2(a). 
 
44 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516–17 (“The threshold question before us is whether the Executive has the authority 
to detain citizens who qualify as ‘enemy combatants’ . . . [we find that regardless of whether the President 
could order detention without Congressional authority, in this situation] Congress has in fact authorized 
Hamdi’s detention, through the AUMF”). 
 
45 Id. at 519. 
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permitting the preventive detention of captured enemy personnel.46 These principles, 
according to the Court, were implicitly invoked by Congress when it authorized the 
President to use all “necessary and appropriate” force against “nations, organizations, 
or persons associated with the September 11th terrorist attacks.”47 In short, the AUMF 
authorized the President to invoke the same principle of military necessity that had 
been central to the Quirin Court’s endorsement of preventive detention of the German 
saboteurs in 1942. 
 The Hamdi opinion laid a legal foundation that continues to be built upon today. 
By extending the Quirin holding to the armed conflict against individuals, 
organizations, and nations associated with the terrorist attacks of September 11th, the 
Court endorsed the application of the armed conflict legal framework to the struggle 
against transnational terrorism.48 However, by condemning the summary process relied 
upon by the Executive Branch to determine that Hamdi fell into the category of 
detainable enemy belligerent, the Court also set in motion a procedural revision process 
that continues to this day.49 Thus, the preventive detention of terrorists pursuant to the 
law of armed conflict involves two distinct legal questions. First, from a substantive 
perspective, who falls within the scope of this preventive detention authority? Second, 
to what process are individuals alleged to fall within that scope entitled? 
a. The Substantive Foundation 
 As significant as Hamdi’s extension of the Quirin precedent was to the “war on 
terror,”50 the Court addressed only what it characterized as the narrow question of 
                                                 
46 Id. 
 
47 See id. at 518. 
 
48 See GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR: A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE 
(2009). 
 
49 See, e.g., BENJAMIN WITTES, ROBERT M. CHESNEY, & RABEA BENHALIM, THE EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION: 
THE GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING 74 (2010), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney/0122_guanta
namo_wittes_chesney.pdf (“[W]hile the detainees are asking the Court of Appeals to adopt a stricter 
standard of proof, the government is asking it to force the lower court judges to lighten up”). 
 
50 The authors use this term to generally define the operations against al Qaeda and Taliban operatives 
occurring primarily in Afghanistan, with the recognition that some operations occur in other countries or 
parts of the world. 
22 
 
whether a U.S. citizen falling into an accepted core definition of enemy combatant could 
be preventively detained: 
 
The threshold question before us is whether the Executive 
has the authority to detain citizens who qualify as “enemy 
combatants.” There is some debate as to the proper scope of 
this term, and the Government has never provided any court 
with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as 
such. It has made clear, however, that, for purposes of this 
case, the “enemy combatant” that it is seeking to detain is an 
individual who, it alleges, was “part of or supporting forces 
hostile to the United States or coalition partners” in 
Afghanistan and who “engaged in an armed conflict against 
the United States” there. We therefore answer only the 
narrow question before us: whether the detention of citizens 
falling within that definition is authorized.51 
 
Concluding Hamdi’s detention did not violate substantive due process was accordingly 
unremarkable. Instead, it was based on the narrow underlying conclusion that 
preventive detention of an enemy combatant in an armed conflict is legally authorized, 
even if, as in the case of Hamdi, the combatant is a U.S. citizen.52 (This conclusion 
perforce means that such authority exists with respect to alien enemy combatants, given 
that aliens enjoy no more constitutional protections than U.S. citizens). This conclusion 
is based on a law of armed conflict axiom: the authority of States to kill enemy 
combatants implies the authority of States to detain them to prevent their return to 
hostilities:53 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
51 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516. 
 
52 See id. at 532–33. 
 
53 The Court previously ruled on a similar issue: whether a State governor could order his National Guard 
contingent to detain State citizens participating in an insurrection or preventing the National Guard from 
restoring the peace. See Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909). In Moyer, the respondent deployed the 
Colorado National Guard to quash what he considered to be an “insurrection” pursuant to his powers 
under the Constitution of Colorado. Petitioner, alleged to be a leader or active participant of the 
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We conclude that detention of individuals falling into the limited category 
we are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which 
they were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as 
to be an exercise of the “necessary and appropriate force” Congress has 
authorized the President to use.54 
 
The Hamdi opinion therefore explicitly validated the legality of preventive detention of 
enemy combatants; however, it did not provide a comprehensive definition of the term 
“enemy combatant.” Instead, the Court expressly left the definitional process to the 
lower courts, noting, “[t]he legal category of enemy combatant has not been elaborated 
upon in great detail. The permissible bounds of the category will be defined by the 
                                                                                                                                                             
insurrection, was detained for two and a half months but suit was never filed against him. In ruling in 
favor of the respondent (and in favor of the detention), the Supreme Court stated: 
The [Colorado] Constitution is supplemented by an act providing that ‘when an invasion 
of or insurrection in the state is made or threatened, the governor shall order the national 
guard to repel or suppress the same’ . . . That means that he shall make the ordinary use 
of the soldiers to that end; that he may kill persons who resist, and, of course, that he 
may use the milder measure of seizing the bodies of those whom he considers to stand in 
the way of restoring peace. Such arrests are not necessarily for punishment, but are by 
way of precaution, to prevent the exercise of hostile power. So long as such arrests are 
made in good faith and in the honest belief that they are needed in order to head the 
insurrection off, the governor is the final judge and cannot be subjected to an action after 
he is out of office, on the ground that he had not reasonable ground for his belief . . . 
When it comes to a decision by the head of the state upon a matter involving its life, the 
ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he deems the necessities of the 
moment. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial 
process. 
Id. at 84–85. Although the case involves a State’s power to deal with intrastate security issues, there are 
obvious parallels to the more recent federal jurisprudence regarding detainment. 
 
54 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518. Additionally the Court noted the “clearly established principle of the law of war 
that detention may last no longer than active hostilities.” See id. at 520 (citing GPW, supra note 17, art. 118) 
(“Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active 
hostilities”)). As pointed out in Hamdi and other cases involving detaining belligerents during the 
ongoing Global War on Terror, it is currently impossible to determine what event(s) would demarcate the 
end of active hostilities for a war fought across the globe against transnational, non-state actors. 
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lower courts as subsequent cases are presented to them.”55 Subsequent U.S. practice, 
judicial decisions, and congressional action in this field all exposed how laced with 
ambiguity this term is in the context of counter-terror operations. 
 
 The Hamdi Court apparently expected greater clarity would result from decisions 
related to subsequent habeas corpus petitions from Guantanamo detainees. However, 
Congress quickly responded to Hamdi (and the Supreme Court’s decision in Rasul v. 
Bush that the federal habeas statute, 18 U.S.C. 2241, applied to detainees in 
Guantanamo)56 by restricting the access of Guantanamo detainees to habeas corpus 
review. These restrictions were set forth in the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), which 
inter alia amended the habeas statute to effectively reverse the decision in Rasul and 
instead provide for an alternative form of review by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.57 
Then, in response to the Supreme Court’s determination in its 2006 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
decision, which held that the DTA did not apply retroactively (this permitting statutory 
habeas challenges to go forward so long as they were pending at the time Congress 
                                                 
55 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 522 n.1. 
 
56 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). The Supreme Court, in considering whether detainees at 
Guantanamo could seek relief under the federal habeas statute, noted the historical applications of the 
writ of habeas corpus and determined that if the issuing court had jurisdiction to issue the writ, then it 
had the power to do so:  
Application of the habeas statute to persons detained at [Guantanamo] is consistent with 
the historical reach of the writ of habeas corpus. At common law, courts exercised habeas 
jurisdiction over the claims of aliens detained within sovereign territory of the realm, as 
well as the claims of persons detained in the so-called “exempt jurisdictions,” where 
ordinary writs did not run, and all other dominions under the sovereign’s control . . . In 
the end, the answer to the question presented is clear. Petitioners contend that they are 
being held in federal custody in violation of the laws of the United States. No party 
questions the District Court’s jurisdiction over petitioners’ custodians. Section 2241, by its 
terms, requires nothing more. We therefore hold that § 2241 confers on the District Court 
jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their detention 
at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. 
Id. at 481–81, 483 (citations omitted). 
 
57 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, Title X; Pub. L. No. 109-163, Title XIV (hereinafter 
“DTA”). 
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passed the DTA),58 Congress enacted the Military Commission Act (MCA) of 2006,59 
which, inter alia, amended the statute so that it was clear that the restrictions imposed 
on statutory habeas access by the DTA applied both prospectively and retrospectively. 
 
 The foregoing series of judicial decisions and countermanding statutory 
amendments set the stage for Boumediene v. Bush.60 Boumediene involved the questions of 
1) whether non-resident aliens detained outside the territory of the United States at the 
Guantanamo detention facility were entitled to the constitutional privilege of habeas 
corpus; and, 2) if so, whether the DTA as amended by the MCA provided an adequate 
substitute for that privilege.61 Writing for a five justice majority, Justice Kennedy held 
that the unique situation of these detainees – detained by the federal government, in an 
area outside the territorial sovereignty of the United States but subject to the exclusive 
control of the United States,62 with no viable alternative access to challenge the legality 
                                                 
58 548 U.S. 557 (2006). The Government’s first challenge to the federal courts exerting habeas jurisdiction 
over Guantanamo detainees was based on an argument that the DTA applied retroactively to cases 
pending at the time of the statute’s enactment. See id. at 574–75. The Court analyzed other provisions of 
the DTA and found language which applied the DTA to pending cases; however this language was 
absent from the jurisdiction-stripping provisions. Id. at 578–79. The Court rejected the retroactively-
applied jurisdiction-stripping argument, holding that “a negative inference may be drawn from the 
exclusion of language from one statutory provision that is included in other provisions of the same 
statute” and determining that “Congress’ [sic] rejection of the very language that would have achieved 
the result the Government urges here weighs heavily against the Government’s interpretation.” Id. at 
579–80. 
  
59 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (hereinafter “MCA”). 
 
60 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 
61 See id. at 732–33. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall 
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it”). The 
Constitution does not actually grant any right to habeas corpus; the Suspension Clause merely states the 
situations under which Congress may suspend the writ. Thus, in American law, the right to habeas relief 
both predates the Constitution of the United States and should be assumed to be available unless 
Congress has enacted legislation under the Suspension Clause to strip away rights to access the writ. 
 
62 Contra Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768–69 (discussing how Johnson v. Eisentrager declined to extend full 
constitutional protections to territories temporarily controlled by the United States (such as the territories 
temporarily occupied and administered by the United States following the German surrender in 1945) 
but asserting that “Guantanamo Bay . . . is no transient possession. In every practical sense Guantanamo 
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of their detention; facing a genuine prospect of generational deprivation of liberty, and 
far removed from the battlefield point of capture63 – required extension of constitutional 
habeas access to allow them to challenge their detention.64 Furthermore, the Court 
concluded that review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 
authorized by the DTA and MCA, was an inadequate substitute for habeas review by a 
court, as required by the U.S. Constitution.65  
 
 As a result of this decision, the process anticipated by Justice O’Connor in her 
Hamdi opinion, by which lower courts would add the proverbial “flesh to the bones” of 
the term “enemy combatant” finally began in earnest. Since the Boumediene decision, the 
federal courts in the District of Columbia Circuit have entertained numerous habeas 
petitions filed by Guantanamo detainees challenging the legality of their continued 
                                                                                                                                                             
is not abroad; it is within the constant jurisdiction of the United States”) (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 
466, 480 (2004) (“By the express terms of its agreements with Cuba, the United States exercises ‘complete 
jurisdiction and control’ over the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, and may continue to exercise such control 
permanently if it so chooses”) (citations omitted)). In his Rasul concurrence, Justice Kennedy also 
emphasizes this point: 
Guantanamo Bay is in every practical respect a United States territory, and it is one far 
removed from any hostilities . . . In a formal sense, the United States leases the Bay; the 
1903 lease agreement states that Cuba retains “ultimate sovereignty” over it . . . At the 
same time, this lease is no ordinary lease. Its term is indefinite and at the discretion of the 
United States. What matters is the unchallenged and indefinite control that the United 
States has long exercised over Guantanamo Bay. From a practical perspective, the 
indefinite lease of Guantanamo Bay has produced a place that belongs to the United 
States, extending the “implied protection” of the United States to it. 
Rasul, 527 U.S. at 487 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777–78 (1950)) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 
63 See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 729 (discussing a concern in the CSRT process and identifying that “the 
consequence of error [in a CSRT tribunal] may be detention for the duration of hostilities that may last a 
generation or more”).  
 
64 See id. at 770–71, 797 (noting that “[s]ome of these petitioners have been in custody for six years with no 
definitive judicial determination as to the legality of their detention” and, as a result, determining that 
“[t]heir access to the writ is a necessity to determine the lawfulness of their status, even if, in the end, they 
do not obtain the relief they seek”).  
 
65 See id. at 791–92. 
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detention. Many of these challenges have required the courts to engage in the process of 
determining, first, how to define “enemy combatant” and second, which petitioners 
have been properly designated by the government as enemy combatants subject to 
lawful preventive detention.66 
 
 The contours of the definition that is gradually emerging from this litigation 
process are sketchy at best. As a result, it is useful to conceptualize the LOAC 
preventive detention authority for terrorist operatives through the following analytical 
model. First, as the courts have recognized that the AUMF is the basis for the authority 
to preventively detain in the present conflict, the courts have focused their analysis on 
defining the groups that fall within the scope of the AUMF, i.e., the Taliban, al Qaeda, 
                                                 
66 Between 2004 and 2009, a total of 581 CSRTs were held; of those, 539 detainees were determined to be 
properly classified as enemy combatants, 39 were found to no longer be classified as enemy combatants, 
and 3 were placed in suspension. Dep’t of Defense, Combatant Status Review Tribunal Summary (Feb. 10, 
2009), http://www.defense.gov/news/csrtsummary.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2012). In those Administrative 
Review Board records made public and held between 2006 and 2008, a total of approximately 707 ARBs 
had been held by February 2008 and approximately 95 detainees were designated to be transferred. See 
generally Dep’t of Defense, Administrative Review Board Summary: Round 2 Update (Apr. 25, 2006), 
http://www.defense.gov/news/arb2.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2012) (reporting that out of 330 detainees 
eligible for an ARB review during the period of  April 25, 2006 to February 20, 2007,  330 ARBs were held, 
55 detainees were designated to transfer and 273 detainees were designated to continue detainment, with 
2 decisions not yet finalized by the Designated Civilian Officer (DCO)); Dep’t of Defense, Administrative 
Review Board Summary: Round 3 Update (Mar. 2008), http://www.defense.gov/news/arb3.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 5, 2012) (reporting that out of 253 detainees eligible for an ARB review during the period of January 
30,2007 to March 2008, 253 ARBs were held, 33 detainees were designated to transfer and 195 detainees 
were designated to continue detainment, with 25 decisions not yet finalized by the DCO); Dep’t of 
Defense, Administrative Review Board Summary: Round 4 Update (Feb. 2006), 
http://www.defense.gov/news/arb4.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2012) (reporting that out of 164 detainees 
eligible for an ARB review during the period of  February 19, 2008 to February 2009, 124 ARBs were held, 
7 detainees were designated to transfer and 92 detainees were designated to continue detainment, with 26 
decisions not yet finalized by the DCO).  As of January 2, 2011, 67 habeas petitions filed by Guantanamo 
detainees have been considered by federal district courts in the D.C. Circuit. See Lyle Denniston, 
Boumediene: The record so far, SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/01/boumediene/ (Jan. 2, 
2011), last visited January 3, 2012. Of 38 granted writs of habeas corpus, the United States did not appeal 
29 and did appeal 9, of which 2 of those appealed by the United States were vacated or reversed. See id. at 
Table 1. Of those 29 detainees whose writs were granted and not appealed, all but 5 detainees had been 
transferred to other countries as of January 2011. Id.  For a discussion of the various detainability 
definitions employed by the D.C. federal district courts and D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, see infra n. 173. 
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and associated forces.67 Second, in order to apply AUMF detention authority, the courts 
have adopted a working definition of an “unlawful enemy belligerent” (the term 
adopted by President Obama as a substitute for the original “unlawful enemy 
combatant” used by President Bush),68 as more fully discussed below. Third, in 
applying the authority and definition in individual cases, the reviewing courts have 
sought to determine (i) whether the government, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
has alleged conduct by the detainee that is sufficient to bring the detainee within the 
definition of “unlawful enemy belligerent” and (ii) whether the government has 
provided sufficient evidence to support its allegations.69 An affirmative finding with 
respect to (i) and (ii) results in the denial of habeas relief and continued preventive 
detention, at least until the Executive chooses to release the detainee through the 
Periodic Review Board process,70 which will be discussed in more detail below. A 
negative finding on either (i) or (ii) results in granting habeas relief and an order to 
release of the detainee (which does not result in actual release until the U.S. government 
has identified a nation willing to take the detainee). This case-by-case approach to each 
detainee who wishes to challenge his detention is the focus of a process of complicated 
and time-consuming habeas litigation before the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia.  
 
 Developing a workable definition of “unlawful enemy belligerent” involves a 
complex synthesis of existing LOAC principles related to preventive detention of 
enemy belligerents and the realities of counter-terror operations. It is impossible to 
ignore the reality that U.S. government has struggled as a result of the absence of 
                                                 
67 See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69–70 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that because the AUMF 
authorized the use of “all necessary and appropriate force” against the non-state organizations involved 
in the 9/11 attacks, the AUMF also implicitly authorized the use of such force, including detention, 
against the members of those organizations and non-member supporters, regardless of whether they 
directly participated in hostilities or not). 
 
68 See Dep’t of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Department of Justice Withdraws “Enemy Combatant” 
Definition for Guantanamo Detainees (March 13, 2009), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/March/09-ag-232.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2012) (hereinafter “DOJ 
Press Release”). 
 
69 See WITTES, supra note 49, at 13 (citing In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 08-442, CMO 
§II.A (D.C. Cir. Nov. 6, 2008) (“The government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the petitioner’s detention is lawful”).  
  
70 See Exec. Order No 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13227 § 3(a) (Mar. 7, 2011). 
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express LOAC authorities applicable to combating transnational terrorism. Combined 
with the operational challenges of conducting effective counter-terrorism operations, 
this has made it difficult to develop a logical and clearly legitimate approach to 
preventive detention of transnational terrorist operatives. As a result, the courts have 
been called upon to intervene to clarify the scope of preventive detention authority, and 
are now decisively engaged in rendering decisions that ostensibly will provide clearer 
guidance on the scope of this authority. Whether such clarity will emerge, or if so 
whether it will be operationally rational, remain open questions. 
 
b. Extending The Traditional Legal Basis to Terrorist Detainees 
 
 Continuing uncertainty aside, it is clear the Hamdi Court’s holding that detention 
of enemy belligerents was a necessary incident of war provided an important 
foundation for subjecting terrorists to preventive detention.71 Hamdi, having been 
captured on the field of battle after engaging U.S. and Coalition forces in combat, fell 
into the core of any definition that could be adopted. The United States, however, 
would extend the detention authority endorsed in Hamdi well beyond that core. 
 
 President Bush defined the category of individuals subject to wartime detention 
in his Military Order #1 directing the detention of captured terrorists at Guantanamo. 
That Order included the following definition of individuals subject to preventive 
detention: 
 
(a) The term “individual subject to this order” shall mean any individual 
who is not a United States citizen with respect to whom I determine from 
time to time in writing that: 
(1) there is reason to believe that such individual, at the 
relevant times; 
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as al 
Qaida; 
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, 
acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation 
                                                 
71 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (“Because detention to prevent a combatant’s return to 
the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of ‘necessary and 
appropriate force,’ Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow 
circumstances considered here”). 
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therefore, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as 
their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United 
States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or 
economy; or 
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals 
described in subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1) of 
this order; and 
(2) it is in the interest of the United States that such 
individual be subject to this order.72 
 
This definition was broader than the category of enemy belligerent analyzed by the 
Hamdi Court.73 Nonetheless, it provided the initial scope of detention authorization 
relied on by the United States. Of particular significance is that it included within its 
scope not only actual terrorist operatives captured during the planning, preparation, or 
execution of hostilities, but also individuals who provide assistance to such 
operatives.74 Additionally, a determination of membership in al Qaida – whatever the 
basis for that determination – would itself be sufficient to trigger preventive detention 
authority.75 
                                                 
72 Military Order No. 1, supra note 40, at § 2(a). While detention is authorized under Military Order No. 1, 
few detainees were actually designated as subject to the Military Order for purpose of detention. See 
JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, ENEMY COMBATANT DETAINEES: HABEAS CORPUS CHALLENGES 
IN FEDERAL COURTS DETENTIONS, CONG. RES. SERV. (Order Code No. RL33180) at 9 n. 59 (last updated Jan. 
29, 2009) available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33180.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2009). Rather, 
such detention generally occurs under the authority granted in the AUMF, which courts have interpreted 
to include the right to detain. 
 
73 On at least two previous occasions, different branches of the federal government considered what 
persons might be designated enemy combatants (or some synonym thereto). Compare Ex parte Quirin, 317 
U.S. 1, 37–38 (1942)“[c]itizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, 
and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents 
within the meaning of ... the law of war”) with Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (“The United 
States may detain, for the duration of these hostilities, individuals legitimately determined to be Taliban 
combatants who ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States.’ If the record establishes that 
United States troops are still involved in active combat in Afghanistan, those . . . are authorized . . .”). 
 
74 See Military Order No. 1, supra note 40, at § 2(a)(1).  
 
75 See id. at § 2(a)(1)(i). 
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 Although President Bush attempted to prohibit judicial review of the legality of 
the preventive detention regime established in Military Order No. 1, it soon became 
clear that the federal courts were unwilling to acquiesce to his effort. In Rasul v. Bush,76 
the Supreme Court rejected the President’s attempt to shield the Guantanamo detention 
operations from judicial scrutiny by interpreting the federal habeas corpus statute to 
run to the Guantanamo Naval Base.77 However, on the same day, the Court in Hamdi 
indicated that judicial review of detentions might not be necessary should the executive 
provide the type of minimal procedural protections the Court indicated were required 
for U.S. citizen detainees.78 In response to the suggestion, the Department of Defense 
implemented a new procedure for assessing the belligerent status of individuals 
transported to Guantánamo.79 
 
 The process implemented by the Department of Defense involved two review 
tribunals for all individuals initially designated by the executive branch as subject to 
Military Order No. 1. The first tribunal was designated as a Combatant Status Review 
Tribunal (CSRT). This CSRT would make the initial determination of whether an 
individual transported to Guantánamo should continue to be detained preventively as 
                                                 
76 542 U.S. 466 (2004). The Supreme Court decided both Hamdi and Rasul on June 28, 2004. 
 
77 Id. at 480 (discussing how the terms of the Guantanamo lease state that the United States “exercises 
‘complete jurisdiction and control’ over the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base,” and as the petitioners are 
under the exclusive custody of the United States, a United States District Court has jurisdiction to hear 
habeas corpus challenges from the petitioners under the federal habeas statute). 
 
78 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533–34. 
 
79 See generally DEP’T OF DEFENSE MEMORANDUM, ORDER ESTABLISHING COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW 
TRIBUNAL (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 4, 2011) (hereinafter “CSRT Order”); DEP’T OF DEFENSE MEMORANDUM, IMPLEMENTATION OF 
COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL PROCEDURES FOR ENEMY COMBATANTS DETAINED AT U.S. NAVAL 
BASE GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA. (July 14, 2006), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Aug2006/d20060809CSRTProcedures.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2011) 
(hereinafter “CSRT Procedures”). See also JENNIFER K. ELSEA, TREATMENT OF “BATTLEFIELD DETAINEES” IN 
THE WAR ON TERRORISM, CONG. RES. SERV., (Order Code No. RL31367) (last updated Jan. 23, 2007) available 
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL3136.pdf (last visited Aug. 11, 2011) (discussing the historical 
treatment of wartime detainees and summarizing legislative acts and proposals related to detention and 
the war on terror considered by the 108th, 109th, and 110th Congressional sessions). 
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the result of being an unlawful enemy combatant (the predecessor term to the currently-
used “unprivileged enemy belligerent”).80 The procedures adopted for the CSRT were 
based loosely on the procedures provided for in Army Regulation (AR) 190-8,81 which 
itself provided the procedures for conducting a review hearing required by the Geneva 
Prisoner of War Convention when the POW status of a detainee is uncertain. However, 
the CSRT provided additional procedural protections that were not set out in AR 190-
8.82 In the context of POW determinations, these tribunals are known as article 5 
tribunals (referring to the article of the Prisoner of War Convention that requires a 
tribunal to determine POW status when a captive’s status is “in doubt”).83  
                                                 
80 The CSRT Order stated that it applied only to foreign nationals held at Guantanamo. See CSRT Order, 
supra note 82, at pmbl. 
 
81 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 190-8: ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, RETAINED PERSONNEL, 
CIVILIAN INTERNEES AND OTHER DETAINEES § 3-15(b) (Oct. 1, 1997) (hereinafter “AR 190-8”). 
 
82 See CSRT Order, supra note 82 at ¶ (g)–(h). 
 
83 The Geneva Prisoner of War Convention states:  
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having 
fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such 
persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has 
been determined by a competent tribunal. 
GPW, supra note 17, at art. 5. The referenced Article 4 defines prisoners of war as:  
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias 
or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. 
(2) Members of other militias and . . . other volunteer corps . . . provided that such 
[organizations] fulfill the conditions of . . . being commanded by a person responsible for 
his subordinates . . . having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance . . . carrying 
arms openly . . . [and] conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and 
customs of war. 
(3) Members of regular armed forces professing allegiance to a government or an 
authority not recognized by the Detaining Power. 
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof . . . 
provided they have received authorization[] from the armed forces which they 
accompany . . . 
(5) Members of crews . . . of the merchant marine and . . . civil aircraft of the Parties to the 
conflict . . . 
(6) Inhabitants of non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy 
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having time to form 
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However, because President Bush determined that the individuals subjected to 
detention at Guantánamo could not qualify as POWs (therefore eliminating any doubt 
that they might qualify for POW status),84 a different characterization was adopted for 
the CSRT. Instead of determining whether they were entitled to POW treatment, a 
CSRT would determine whether detainees were unlawful enemy combatants.85 If an 
                                                                                                                                                             
themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the 
laws and customs of war. 
Id. at art. 4(A). Subsection (B) defines two additional categories of persons who are treated as POWs 
under the Prisoner of War Convention. In his commentary to the Third Convention, Jean S. Pictet (who 
served as an editor for the 1949 Geneva Conventions) describes the intent leading up to the adoption of 
the second paragraph of Article 5: 
At Geneva in 1949, it was first proposed that for the sake of precision the term 
“responsible authority” should be replaced by “military tribunal”. This amendment was 
based on the view that decisions which might have the gravest consequences should not 
be left to a single person, who might often be of subordinate rank. The matter should be 
taken to a court, as persons taking part in the fight without the right to do so are liable to 
be prosecuted for murder or attempted murder, and might even be sentenced to capital 
punishment. This suggestion was not unanimously accepted, however, as it was felt that 
to bring a person before a military tribunal might have more serious consequences than a 
decision to deprive him of the benefits afforded by the Convention. A further 
amendment was therefore made to the Stockholm text stipulating that a decision 
regarding persons whose status was in doubt would be taken by a “competent tribunal”, 
and not specifically a military tribunal. 
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION (III) RELATIVE 
TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 77 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952) (internal citations omitted) 
(hereinafter Pictet). It is clear that from the beginning of the codification of proper treatment for any 
detained enemy combatants, whether lawful combatants entitled to POW status or unlawful combatants 
not entitled thereto, that the military tribunal might not be the proper forum in which the status 
determination should be made. However, it is telling that those who drafted and edited the 1949 
Conventions did not truly imagine a world where combatants would truly be owned by no nation: in the 
first sentence of his commentary on paragraph 2 of Article 5, Pictet writes: “This [paragraph] would 
apply to deserters, and to persons who accompany the armed forces and have lost their identity card.” Id. 
 
84 CNN, Bush says no POW status for detainees (Jan. 28, 2002), http://articles.cnn.com/2002-01-
28/us/ret.wh.detainees_1_detainees-camp-x-ray-unlawful-combatants?_s=PM:US (last visited October 20, 
2011). 
 
85 See JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, ENEMY COMBATANT DETAINEES: HABEAS CORPUS 
CHALLENGES IN FEDERAL COURTS DETENTIONS, CONG. RES. SERV., (Order Code No. RL33180) at 7 (last 
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individual was designated as an unlawful enemy combatant, detention would be 
authorized indefinitely subject to an annual review to assess the continued detention 
justification. This annual review would be conducted by a second tribunal, which had 
been established prior to (and possibly in anticipation of) the Rasul and Hamdi 
decisions, known as the Administrative Review Board (ARB).86 
 
 The CSRTs would obviously need a standard to apply to determine who would 
remain in preventive detention and who had been improperly detained and transported 
to Guantánamo. The order issued by the Secretary of Defense directing the Secretary of 
the Navy (presumably because the Navy operates Guantanamo) to establish the CSRT 
provided the following definition: 
 
a. Enemy Combatant. For purposes of this Order, the term 
“enemy combatant” shall mean an individual who was 
part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or 
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against 
the United States or its coalition partners. This includes 
any person who has committed a belligerent act or has 
directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed 
forces. Each detainee subject to this Order has been 
determined to be an enemy combatant through multiple 
levels of review by officers of the Department of 
Defense.87 
  
This definition did seem to establish the requirement for a more direct link between the 
detainee and the conduct of combat operations than that in Military Order No. 1. 
However, by also including within the definition of detainable captive individuals who 
                                                                                                                                                             
updated Jan. 29, 2009) available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33180.pdf (last visited Aug. 11, 
2010). See also generally Dep’t of Defense, Combatant Status Review Tribunals, 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Oct2006/d20061017CSRT.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2012). 
 
86 See generally DEP’T OF DEFENSE MEMORANDUM, IMPLEMENTATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW 
PROCEDURES FOR ENEMY COMBATANTS DETAINED AT U.S. NAVAL BASE GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA. (July 14, 
2006), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Aug2006/d20060809ARBProceduresMemo.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 4, 2011) (hereinafter “ARB Procedures”). See also infra n. 105, 161–62. 
 
87 CSRT Order, supra note 82, at ¶ (a). 
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provided support to al Qaeda or the Taliban, it produced no significant difference 
between the controlling standard to be applied by the CSRTs and the President’s initial 
definition. 
 
 Another definition that emerged in response to the initial detainee decisions by 
the Supreme Court was included in the Military Commission Act of 2006 (MCA). This 
law was enacted by Congress in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan 
striking down the military commission ordered established by President Bush in 
Military Order No. 1.88 Congress enacted the MCA to both cure the procedural defects 
that had doomed that original military commission and to ensure that unlawful enemy 
combatants detained at Guantánamo would in fact be subject to trial by military 
commission. Accordingly, it was necessary for Congress to provide its own definition of 
who fell within MCA jurisdiction - a definition that by implication also indicates who 
may be preventively detained. According to 10 U.S.C. § 948a, the persons subject to the 
MCA include: 
 
(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has 
purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the 
United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful 
enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the 
Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or 
 
(ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the 
enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, has been 
determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another competent 
tribunal established under the authority of the President or 
the Secretary of Defense.89 
 
                                                 
88 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
applicable to the armed conflict against al Qaeda and further holding that the military commissions did 
not constitute “regularly constituted courts” as required by Common Article 3). 
 
89 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006) (as enacted by Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3, 120 
Stat. 2600 (2006)). To be subject to trial by military commission, a person meeting the definition of 
unlawful enemy combatant also must be an alien (i.e., not a U.S. citizen.) Id. 
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What is most significant about both the definition adopted by the Department of 
Defense for purposes of the CSRTs, and the definition enacted by Congress in the 2006 
MCA, is that each indicates that persons who materially support a terrorist group need 
not actually commit belligerent acts in order to be treated as enemy combatants. 
 
 This broad definition would remain the basis for U.S. detentions for as long as 
the detention process remained outside judicial scrutiny. Accordingly, the United States 
could, and often did, subject captured aliens believed to be part of or to have provided 
support to al Qaeda to detention without charge or trial.90 The CSRTs did provide a 
limited check on this process, but only in relation to the weight of the evidence 
supporting the characterization and not in relation to the definition itself. Nor did the 
limited judicial review of CSRT decisions subsequently authorized in the Detainee 
Treatment Act provide detainees with a viable opportunity to challenge the scope of the 
enemy combatant definition; it merely authorized judicial review of whether the CSRT 
had followed its own procedures.91  
 
 In June 2008, the efforts of the President and Congress to limit judicial review of 
preventive detention of Guantanamo detainees were nullified by the Supreme Court’s 
decision of Boumediene v. Bush.92 In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that (i) the detainees 
enjoyed a constitutional privilege to petition the federal courts for habeas corpus; (ii) 
the review procedures in the CSRTs and the Detainee Treatment Act were not an 
adequate substitute for this privilege; and (iii) the detainees could challenge their 
continued detention as a violation of both substantive and procedural due process.93 
This decision cleared the way for detainees to challenge not only the process they had 
                                                 
90 See, e.g., Scott Shane & Adam Liptak, Detainee Bill Shifts Power to President, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006, at 
A1 (discussing the powers granted to the President under the post-9/11 enemy combatant detention 
statutes, including the powers “to identify enemies, imprison them indefinitely and interrogate them — 
albeit with a ban on the harshest treatment — beyond the reach of the full court reviews traditionally 
afforded criminal defendants and ordinary prisoners”). 
 
91 See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, TREATMENT OF “BATTLEFIELD DETAINEES” IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM, CONG. RES. 
SERV., 53-55, (Order Code No. RL31367) (last updated Jan. 23, 2007) available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL31367.pdf (last visited Aug. 11, 2010). 
 
92 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 
93 See id. at 786–87. 
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been afforded to authorize their preventive detention, but perhaps more importantly 
the scope of the definition of enemy belligerent itself – the definition pursuant to which 
they were detained. The response by both the Executive Branch and the courts that 
began to decide these challenges is ongoing at the time of this writing, although the 
trend seems to be towards strengthening the link between the LOAC principle of 
military necessity and the definition that justifies preventive detention. By opening the 
door to federal court review, Boumediene placed Guantánamo detainees in what is in 
actuality an enviable position. 
 
c. Recent Evolution of the Detention Review Process: The Bagram Model 
 
While many of the Supreme Court opinions related to detainment have issued 
from suits filed by detainees held in Cuba, the Bagram Collection Point (BCP) near 
Kabul, Afghanistan has been the primary detention facility for terrorist operatives 
captured in Afghanistan since May 2002.94 From Bagram, some detainees were 
transferred to Guantánamo, while others remained detained in Afghanistan.95 It was at 
Bagram that the first detainee review boards occurred, wherein personnel from several 
different military offices reviewed detainee files and applied the classified criteria that 
might require the detainee to be transferred to another facility such as Guantanamo.96 
From 2002 to the present, the detainee review boards conducted at detention facilities 
have undergone multiple iterations in name, form, and procedure.  
                                                 
94 See Prescott, supra note 24, at 9–14 (describing the history of the American presence at Bagram area and 
the changes made with the Parwan detention facility); Jeff A. Bovarnick, Detainee Review Boards in 
Afghanistan: From Strategic Liability to Legitimacy, 2010-JUN Army Law. 9, 15 (2010). See also infra note 154 
(discussing the number of detainees at Guantanamo versus the number at Bagram, as well as the number 
of detainees classified as eligible for release or transfer, and statistics on the number of military 
commission trials held since 2001). 
 
95 GlobalSecurity.org, Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/guantanamo-bay_detainees.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 
2011). The last news release announcing a transfer of detainees to Guantanamo occurred on September 
12, 2007; the last transfer from Afghanistan to Guantanamo occurred in 2004. Id. 
 
96 Bovarnick, supra note 98, at 16 (“The composition of the DRB was approximately ten personnel, 
including MI, MPs, the members of the Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF), and a judge advocate 
legal advisor”). 
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The first set of detainability review meetings were conducted by Detention 
Review Boards (DRBs) making assessments from 2002 until 2005. In September 2004, 
transfers between Bagram and Guantanamo ceased, in large part due to the Supreme 
Court’s rulings in Rasul v. Bush and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld three months prior.97 During the 
initial two years of DRBs at Bagram, detainees were still being transferred from Bagram 
to Guantanamo; thus, “the primary determination of the DRB was whether or not a 
detainee met the (classified) criteria to be transferred to GTMO.”98 Additionally, a major 
                                                 
97 See id. at 18. As Rasul established that federal courts could decide whether noncitizens detained at 
Guantanamo were wrongfully imprisoned and Hamdi held that detainees who are U.S. citizens must have 
the ability to challenge their enemy combatant status before an impartial court, it is unsurprising that the 
Administration would decide to cease transferring detainees to Guantanamo and thus effectively give 
them access to the federal courts. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 
(2004). The Administration may have believed that keeping detainees out of Guantanamo would also 
prevent them from challenging their detention in court due to the suspension of habeas corpus provided 
in the MCA; in 2010, the D.C. Circuit held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear habeas 
petitions filed by detainees at Bagram. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010), rev’g 604 F. 
Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioners’ writs 
of habeas corpus, as petitioners were held at Bagram, outside the de jure sovereignty of the United States 
and thus previous statutory invocations of the Article I, Section 9 Suspension Clause served to deny the 
district court jurisdiction over petitioners’ habeas petitions). See also Prescott, supra note 24, at 33–35 
(discussing the district court’s six analytical factors parsed from Boumediene: “detainee citizenship, 
detainee status, nature of the apprehension site, nature of the detention site, adequacy of the status 
determination process and ‘practical obstacles inherent in resolving the petitioner’s entitlement to the 
writ’” and the court’s addition of a seventh factor: “’the length of a petitioner’s detention without 
adequate review.’” As Boumediene had set out factors but had not deeply analyzed them, the district court 
made determinations of which factors should carry more—or any—weight. See id.) (quoting Al Maqaleh 
v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 215–16 (2009), rev’d, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). 
 
98 Bovarnick, supra note 98, at 16. Bovarnick describes the process of the DRB at the time: 
All available information—whether sparse “evidence packets” from the capturing units 
or packets built by interrogators in the BCP—was brought before the DRB to assess the 
criteria. If the detainee did not appear to meet even the threshold determination of being 
an enemy combatant due to the lack of evidence, as a courtesy (not a requirement), a 
designated DRB member would contact the capturing unit after the pre-meeting to 
inform the commander of the detainee's likely release recommendation if no further 
information was provided. In general, this revelation would often prompt units to send 
representatives to the DRB to “testify” about the circumstances of capture and provide 
relevant evidence on the detainee's acts, if any, to make a case for continued detention. 
As a detainee's case was presented, the members of the DRB would form a consensus 
regarding whether the detainee met the criteria of an enemy combatant. If the consensus 
39 
 
determination of whether to transfer a detainee to Guantanamo was the potential to 
gather further intelligence from them.99 If the DRB determined that the detainee was an 
enemy combatant but did not meet the Guantanamo transfer requirements, then 
Military Intelligence would make a determination as to whether the detainee had future 
intelligence value or presented a continued security threat; if so, they would continue to 
be detained.100 At no point in the DRB process was the detainee informed that the DRB 
was occurring; additionally, only those individuals actually detained at the BCP 
underwent the DRB process, even though the BCP itself housed far fewer detainees 
than the total number of individuals detained in Afghanistan.101 
In 2004, Bagram was re-designated as the Bagram Theater Internment Facility 
(BTIF) and in 2005, the DRBs changed to Enemy Combatant Review Boards (ECRBs). 
The 2005 policy change would remain in effect until January 2007.102  
                                                                                                                                                             
was that there was not enough evidence, a recommendation for release would be made, 
and the detainee would be placed on a “release list” to be approved by the Commander . 
. . If the detainee was determined to be an enemy combatant, the next question was 
whether the detainee met the criteria to be sent to GTMO. 
Id. at 16–17.  
 
99 Id. at 17. 
 
100 Id.  
 
101 Id. Bovarnick thusly describes the state of affairs for DRBs from 2002-2005: 
Between May 2002 and June 2003, based on the . . . commander's guidance, the maximum 
number of detainees in the BCP never exceeded one hundred. While the overall detainee 
population, which included the Kandahar detention facility and other temporary 
detention sites, was much larger, only those detainees at the BCP went through the DRB 
process. During this first year, anywhere from ten to fifteen detainee files were reviewed 
each week with each DRB session to review and discuss detainee files with the CJ2 [the 
lead intelligence officer] lasting up to two hours. With the constant flow of detainees in 
and out of the BCP, the number of files reviewed was simply a calculation to process the 
ninety-day reviews. In the summer of 2003, the maximum number of detainees 
authorized in the BCP doubled to two hundred; consequently, the number of files 
reviewed at each DRB rose accordingly. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 
102 Id. at 18–19. Bovarnick notes that the process remained very similar to the 2002-2005 DRB review but 
points out one positive change in transferring some detainees to local authorities for prosecution: 
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In February 2007, the boards’ name changed again, to Unlawful Enemy 
Combatant Review Boards (UECRB). Accompanying the name change were changes to 
composition (dropping from five officers sitting the Board to three) and procedure 
which would last until September 2009.103 The first and most important change, 
implemented standard in April 2008, was officially providing a detainee with notice of 
his UECRB.104 This notice provided a detainee with information as to the “general basis 
                                                                                                                                                             
Other than the name change and the alteration in board composition [reducing the 
number of military officers sitting on the Boards], the procedures were similar to those 
dating back to 2002; detainees could not appear in person before the boards, nor did they 
have a personal representative (PR). The ECRBs met once per week, but instead of 
holding pre-meetings like the ones that met in the 2002-2005 timeframe, the board 
members were provided detainee packets in advance and then convened to discuss the 
packets and vote on whether the detainee met the criteria for enemy combatant status. 
The only oral evidence presented at the ECRB was still given by the MI personnel who 
prepared the detainee packets. If the capturing unit had an interest, for either detention 
or release, they could send a representative to the board to argue their position. [FN68] 
While transfer to GTMO was no longer an option, the ECRB could recommend release or 
continued detention in certain categories based on the level of threat. In an important 
step forward in both the Rule of Law and counterinsurgency realms, new options for the 
ECRBs were explored such as transfer to the Afghan authorities for prosecution or 
repatriation programs. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 
103 Addition to the Board’s duties included categorizing the detainees based on relative intelligence value 
and threat level, and also determining the viability of local prosecution: 
Detainees [were divided] into separate categories: High Level Enemy Combatant 
(HLEC); Low Level Enemy Combatants (LLEC); and Threat only. Those who were to be 
released were categorized as No Longer Enemy Combatant (NLEC). As the UECRB 
worked its way through the six hundred detainees in the BTIF, the files of all detainees 
assessed as LLECs were transferred to the DAB [Detainee Assessment Branch, which 
made recommendations of prosecution to the local Afghan legal authorities]. The DAB, 
comprised of military intelligence analysts and military criminal investigators, assessed 
the detainee files for potential transfer to Afghan authorities for prosecution. To support 
the Rule of Law mission, the DAB would only recommend transfer of cases for 
prosecution if there was solid evidence. Those detainees not recommended for transfer 
remained interned until their next review in six months. 
Id. at 19–20 (citations omitted). 
 
104 Id. at 19. However, even in 2008, there were discrepancies between detainee rights at Bagram and the 
rights of those detained in Guantanamo: 
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of his detention” and allowed the detainee to appear before his board and make a 
statement.105 
In January 2009, President Obama signed three Executive Orders related to the 
interrogation of detainees and procedures to be followed at detainment centers.106 
Significantly, Order 13,493 included the following definition of who could be detained: 
The President has the authority to detain persons that the President 
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks 
that occurred on September 11, 2001, and persons who harbored those 
responsible for those attacks. 
The President also has the authority to detain persons who were part of, 
or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces 
that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition 
partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act, or 
has directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces.107 
Order 13,493 thus establishes the legal framework for a unit to detain an individual on 
the battlefield; “if this threshold determination is not met on the battlefield, then a unit 
                                                                                                                                                             
[D]eficiencies included ‘no recourse to a neutral decisionmaker’ on status determinations; 
no access to even a personal representative before the hearing board for the petitioners; 
only an opportunity to submit a written statement to the board rather than to speak; no 
right for the petitioners to see the evidence which inculpated them; and uncertain 
evidentiary standards. 
See Prescott, supra note 24, at 38 (quoting Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 226–27 (D.D.C. 2009), 
rev’d, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).  
 
105 Fixing Bagram: Strengthening Detention Reforms to Align with U.S. Strategic Priorities, HUM. RTS. FIRST 
16 n.23 (Nov. 2009) (citing Declaration of Colonel Charles A. Tennison (Sept. 15, 2008)). 
 
106 See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 C.F.R. 4893 (2009) (ensuring lawful interrogations); Exec. Order No. 
13,492, 74 C.F.R. 4897 (2009) (Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval 
Base and Closure of Detention Facilities); Exec. Order 13,493, 74 C.F.R. 4901 (2009) (Review of Detention 
Policy Options). 
 
107 Exec. Order 13,493 § 1(a). 
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has no authority to detain.”108 At the same time the President issued this Executive 
Order, the Secretary of Defense was preparing to implement new board procedures and 
the creation of the Afghanistan and Joint Task Force, the task force “charged with 
running all detention operations in Afghanistan, and more specifically, the Legal 
Operations Directorate of JTF 435, the team responsible for the daily operations of the 
DRBs.”109 Notably and as discussed below, the Secretary of Defense’s July 2009 
detention policy does not apply to approximately 80% of American troops operating in 
Afghanistan.110  
                                                 
108 Bovarnick, supra note 98, at 21. Once detained, the review board applies the procedures set forth in July 
2009 by the Secretary of Defense in making initial detention decisions as well as during the regular 
review process. See id.  
 
109 Id. at 11 (explaining that the changes to the board process were “designed to ensure that due process 
protections are afforded to the detainees housed at the new Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP).” Id.). 
Unfortunately, the D.C. Circuit’s May 2009 decision in al Maqaleh v. Gates—which occurred after 
President Obama’s Executive Order but prior to the implementation of the Secretary of Defense’s new 
policies—did not analyze or discuss “the new procedure . . . put in place [at Parwan, and thus] the issue 
of how much process Parwan detainees should be afforded in their status hearings remains to be seen.” 
Id. at 48. 
 
110 The 2009 policy change applies only to USFOR-A, which is composed of 
U.S. Special Operations Forces (the capturing units), Joint Task Force 435, which runs all 
detention operations in Afghanistan (discussed in detail below), and other critical 
enablers, such as route clearance and Palladin units.  
Id. at 21. The remaining 80%+ of U.S. troops are deployed as part of the international ISAF mission; their 
detainment policy is discussed infra at note 116. This arrangement is further explained by Prescott: 
The status of military personnel who are part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the 
original U.S. mission in Afghanistan, is set out in an exchange of diplomatic notes 
between the U.S. and Afghanistan. Under this arrangement, Afghanistan agrees to waive 
criminal jurisdiction over these personnel, and to allow U.S. personnel and equipment 
freedom of movement into and out of Afghanistan to conduct operations without the 
need to pay taxes and duties or to obtain visas. Specifically, U.S. personnel are “accorded 
a status equivalent to that accorded to the administrative and technical staff” of the U.S. 
Embassy, and are immune to Afghan criminal jurisdiction. The Parwan Detention 
Facility is considered an OEF mission. The other legal regime governing the presence of 
U.S. personnel is found in the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) between the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghanistan. The majority of U.S> 
forces in Afghanistan, and almost all of the international forces, are covered by the MTA. 
Under its terms, Afghanistan has waived criminal, tax and customs jurisdiction over 
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An important note is that the 2009 procedures established by the President and 
DoD are applicable only to U.S. Forces-Afghanistan/Operation Enduring Freedom 
(USFOR-A/OEF), not the International and Security Assistance Force (ISAF); while 
forces of USFOR-A/OEF have all the power given by the President to detain 
individuals in Afghanistan, ISAF follows a different detainment policy.111 The major 
difference in detention authority between USFOR-A/OEF and ISAF is that “USFOR-A 
can send captured personnel to the DFIP whereas ISAF units (including the U.S. forces 
assigned to ISAF) cannot.”112 
In March 2011, President Obama signed an Executive Order related to the 
continuing status review of Guantanamo detainees.113 This Order established Periodic 
Review Boards (PRBs) for all detainees and mandated an initial review for each 
                                                                                                                                                             
ISAF forces and has afforded them complete freedom of movement across its borders 
and within the country.  
Prescott, supra note 24, at 12–13 (citations omitted).  
 
111 See Bovarnick, supra note 98, at 21. The ISAF is part of the NATO mission in Afghanistan, and roughly 
83% of U.S. forces in Afghanistan (nearly 78,500 out of 95,000 personnel) are assigned to ISAF. Id. The 
roughly 17,000 U.S. troops not assigned to ISAF fall under USFOR-A and continue to operate under the 
authority of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Id. 
 
112 Id. The policy for individuals captured by ISAF on the battlefield is as follows: 
All insurgents captured by ISAF troops must be turned over to the Afghan National 
Security Directorate (NDS), either within ninety-six hours [the general time frame since 
2005] for non-U.S. ISAF units or fourteen days for U.S. ISAF units [the U.S.-specific time 
frame since March 2010]. The NDS is Afghanistan’s domestic intelligence agency with 
jurisdiction over all insurgent and terrorist activity. In essence, the NDS has the right of 
first refusal to accept the transfer of captured personnel believed to be insurgents or 
terrorists. In addition to the personnel that might be expected to make up an intelligence 
agency, the NDS also has a staff of investigators that specifically work to prepare cases 
for prosecution within the Afghan criminal justice system. Currently, a team of Afghan 
prosecutors and judges with special expertise are temporarily assigned to work 
exclusively with the NDS to coordinate this effort to try suspected insurgents and 
terrorists under the appropriate Afghan criminal laws within the Afghan criminal justice 
system. Each province in Afghanistan has at least one judge and several prosecutors 
assigned to work on NDS cases. 
Id. at 21–22 (citations omitted). 
 
113 See Exec. Order 13,567, 76 C.F.R. 13277 (Mar. 7, 2011). 
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detainee to occur no later than March 7, 2012. The greatest changes to the detainment 
review process included in this Order include the right of detainees to be assisted by 
private counsel (although counsel will not be appointed or provided by the 
Government and thus must be retained privately by the detainee) and for the detainee 
himself to make an oral or written statement to the PRB, present information, answer 
the PRB’s questions, and call witnesses on his own behalf.114 If the PRB determines that 
the detainee should not be released, the Order states that “continued detention . . . shall 
be subject to subsequent full reviews and hearings by the PRB on a triennial basis.”115 
Additionally, continued detainment will be “subject to a file review every 6 months in 
the intervening years between full reviews”; the detainee is not permitted to verbally 
address the PRB conducting a file review but may “make a written submission in 
connection with each file review.” The Order provides that the file review will include 
any relevant new information about the detainee collected and compiled since the 
previous review and that “[i]f, during the file review, a significant question is raised as 
to whether the detainee’s continued detention is warranted  . . . the PRB will promptly 
convene a full review . . .”116 
The detainment assessment and review process has undergone drastic changes 
between its inception in 2002 and President Obama’s 2011 Executive Order. Where 
initial determinations were made primarily on the basis of future intelligence gathering, 
recent changes have provided increasing amounts of traditional due process to 
detainees not only in Guantanamo, but in Afghanistan—detainees who do not currently 
have the power to challenge their detentions with habeas corpus.117 
 
Part III: Powell v. Alabama and the Significance of Value Based Legal Representation 
                                                 
114 Id. at § 3(a)(2). 
 
115 Id. at § 3(b). 
 
116 Id. at § 3(c). 
 
117 See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010), rev’g 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding 
that the Military Commissions Act’s invocation of the Suspension Clause precludes detainees at Bagram, 
located outside the de jure sovereignty of the United States, from challenging their detention in federal 
district court using habeas corpus). 
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 When the Supreme Court struck down the convictions in the first round of 
Scottsboro trials, the standards of zealous advocacy were customary at best. Unlike 
today, lawyers were not bound to ethical codes of conduct that imposed this duty.118 
Nonetheless, representation of a criminal defendant by an individual inculcated in the 
lawyer ethos of zealousness was central to the Court’s decision. The Alabama Supreme 
Court had rejected Powell’s claim of denial of meaningful representation based on the 
events the day of his trial. When the case was called, the trial judge noted that the 
defendants desired, but did not have counsel. In response, he called upon the local bar 
to fill the void. Two lawyers apparently answered the call. This aspect of the trials was 
noted by the United States Supreme Court.119 However, for that Court, the fatal flaw 
around which all of the Justices coalesced was the unavoidable conclusion that 
whatever representation the defendants had received was at best pro forma, and did not 
comport with the customary standards of zealousness central to the lawyer ethos.120 
 Zealous commitment to the interests of a client, even when disagreeing with the 
client’s cause or conduct, is indeed central to the lawyer ethos, and a fundamental 
foundation of meaningful representation. It is also central to the ethical obligations of a 
lawyer acting as an advocate, as indicated by the American Bar Association Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, which charges lawyers to “zealously assert[] the client’s 
position under the rules of the adversary system.”121 
                                                 
118 See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (1983). 
 
119 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53–56 (1932) (noting the casualness with which two attorneys, one 
of whom was from Tennessee and not a member of the Alabama bar but nevertheless offered to assist in 
the defense, became counsel of record for the Scottsboro Boys on the day of trial. In criticizing the failure 
of the trial court to specifically appoint counsel, the Court noted, “until the very morning of the trial no 
lawyer had been named or definitely designated to represent the defendants.” The Court then held that 
the trial court’s designation of the entire local bar as “counsel” for the defendants, an appointment made 
strictly for the purpose of arraignment, “even if made for all purposes, would, in our opinion, have fallen 
far short of meeting, in any proper sense, a requirement for the appointment of counsel”). 
 
120 See id. at 59 (“The record indicates that the appearance was rather pro forma than zealous and active . . 
. Under the circumstances disclosed, we hold that defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in 
any substantial sense. To decide otherwise, would simply be to ignore actualities”). 
 
121 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. § 2 (1983). However, the Preamble is purely aspirational, not a 
binding Rule upon attorneys. In Rule 1.3, the Model Rules states: “A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (1983). While 
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 The duty of zealousness is not something created by the Model Rules. Well 
before jurisdictions even began to codify ethical standards for the legal profession, 
commitment to a client’s cause and zealous advocacy of that cause have been at the core 
of the legal profession. One early and profoundly compelling example of this was John 
Adams’s representation of the British soldiers accused of murder for their part in the 
Boston Massacre.122 Adams risked the scorn of his community to fulfill his obligation to 
his clients, who were all acquitted. The history of American law is replete with other 
examples equally inspiring. In fact, one of those examples was part of the sordid story 
of the Scottsboro trials.  
After the Supreme Court overturned the original convictions, all of the 
defendants were retried. One of them, Haywood Patterson, was represented by Sam 
Leibowitz.123 Leibowitz, a lawyer from New York who immigrated to the United States 
with his family as a young boy, was hired by the International Labor Defense (a group 
associated with the Communist Party of America) to represent Patterson. Leibowitz 
threw himself into a truly hostile environment in the Alabama community of Decautor. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Rule 1.3 does not explicitly discuss a “zealous representation” requirement for attorneys, commentary to 
the Rules express the intent of the Model Rule drafters. In Comment 1 to Rule 1.3, the Model Rules state: 
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or 
personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are 
required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act with 
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon 
the client's behalf.  
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (1983). Similar Rules appear in customized State Rules of 
Professional Conduct. For example, Texas’s Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct state: 
[A] lawyer should act with competence, commitment and dedication to the interest of the 
client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf. A lawyer should feel a moral or 
professional obligation to pursue a matter on behalf of a client with reasonable diligence 
and promptness despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer. 
Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 1.01 cmt. 6.  
 
122 For a transcript of Adams’s defense speech, see JOHN ADAMS, LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, NO. 64. 
REX V. WEMMS 260–70, available at http://www.bostonmassacre.net/trial/acct-adams1.htm (last visited 
January 3, 2012). 
 
123 Leibowitz ultimately represented all of the Scottsboro Boys. Patterson’s trial was the second of four 
total. Ozie Powell, whose name appears in the style of cause for Powell v. Alabama, was tried with four of 
the other Boys after Patterson; Patterson was convicted within minutes of the Powell trial beginning. 
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Having amassed a remarkable record of seventy-seven acquittals in seventy-eight first 
degree murder trials, Leibowitz devoted the next four years of his life to Patterson’s 
defense. Neither the urgings of his friends and family nor the routine threats to his life 
deterred him from his duty.  
Ultimately, Leibowitz fell short in his efforts, and Patterson was again convicted; 
Patterson was incarcerated until his successful escape in 1947. He died five years later of 
cancer while in a Michigan prison for an unrelated manslaughter conviction.124  
 Nevertheless, Leibowitz’s commitment to perhaps the most “radioactive” client 
in Alabama history stands to this day as a model of legal professionalism. Similar 
stories, although perhaps less dramatic, play out every day in the American legal 
system. The ability to distinguish the advocacy of a client’s legal cause from the 
embracing that cause is core aspect of zealous advocacy, and one of the most difficult 
concepts for new law students to understand. “How can anyone defend the guilty?” is a 
question most criminal law professors encounter early in a student’s career. The clear 
answer appears in the pre-amble to the American Bar Association Model Rules of 
Professional Responsibility for Lawyers: “a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position 
under the rules of the adversary system.”125  
Lawyers understand that this zealous advocacy, even when on behalf of an 
individual accused of the most heinous crime, ultimately contributes to justice and the 
rule of law because: 
[A] lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the 
legal system and a public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, when an 
opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on 
behalf of a client and at the same time assume that justice is being done.126 
It is unlikely that the average non-lawyer understands the significance of this lawyer 
ethos. Few lay persons can reconcile the concept of justice with the effective 
representation of those who appear obviously guilty. But lawyers are educated on (and 
                                                 
124 See University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, Haywood Patterson, 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/scottsboro/SB_bPATT.html (last visited January 3, 2011).  
 
125 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. § 2 (1983). 
 
126 Id. at § 8. 
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ostensibly understand) the true meaning of the presumption of innocence, and how 
zealous representation ensures individuals accused by the government are afforded the 
process they are due before that legal presumption is rebutted. Convicting the guilty is 
unquestionably important, but it is zealous representation of a defendant in the 
adversarial process that ensures the credibility of these convictions. As Justice Scalia 
famously wrote on the notion that ensuring all process due is completely supersedes 
the interest in merely obtaining convictions in criminal charges, “[d]ispensing with 
confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury 
trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment 
prescribes.”127  
The relationship between zealous representation and legitimate criminal justice 
process has been central to the Supreme Court's jurisprudence.128 In its landmark 
opinion of Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment 
(incorporated against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment as a component of 
fundamental due process rights) required more than merely the right to be represented; 
it required that the state provide for representation of indigent criminal defendants.129 
The motivation for this decision was not merely the credibility of the criminal justice 
process. Instead, it was protection of individuals from post-conviction incarceration 
without meaningful process. Because all of these concerns were inextricably intertwined 
in Gideon’s challenge, the Court explicitly addressed only the right to counsel in the 
criminal justice process. However, the Court’s subsequent jurisprudence determining 
scope of the Gideon right to counsel indicates that protection of the liberty interest, and 
                                                 
127 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004). 
 
128 The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence [sic].” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Fourteenth 
Amendment provides that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. Through selective incorporation, the Supreme Court has 
held the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applicable against the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (holding that “a 
provision of the Bill of Rights which is ‘fundamental and essential to a fair trial’ is made obligatory upon 
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment” and that the right to counsel is one of those fundamental and 
essential rights) (citing Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963)). 
 
129 372 U.S. at 344–45. 
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not merely protection from false conviction, is the dominant interest related to this 
right. 
Gideon did not clearly delineate situations that trigger the right government 
provided counsel to indigent criminal defendants. In Scott v. Illinois, the Supreme Court 
held that the Gideon right to counsel applied whenever an individual was charged with 
a crime that resulted in conviction and even only one day of criminal incarceration.130 
The Court rejected the proposal to use the felony/misdemeanor dichotomy as the 
trigger for the right; however, the Court also rejected the proposal to extend the right to 
any individual charged with a criminal offense.131 Instead, it was the combined effect of 
a criminal charge and incarceration that created a sufficient interest to justify imposing 
a burden on the government to provide counsel to indigent defendants. Referring to an 
earlier decision that was less emphatic on the issue, the Court concluded: 
In Argersinger, the Court rejected arguments that social cost or a lack of 
available lawyers militated against its holding, in some part because it 
thought these arguments were factually incorrect. But they were rejected 
in much larger part because of the Court's conclusion that incarceration 
was so severe a sanction that it should not be imposed as a result of a 
criminal trial unless an indigent defendant had been offered appointed 
counsel to assist in his defense, regardless of the cost to the States implicit 
in such a rule.132  
This incarceration trigger remains in effect to this day. Accordingly, even defendants 
charged with minor misdemeanor offenses are entitled to free representation in the 
                                                 
130 Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 367 (1979) (holding that a court is not required “to appoint counsel for a 
criminal defendant . . . who is charged with a statutory offense for which imprisonment upon conviction 
is authorized but not [actually] imposed”). 
 
131 See id. at 373–74 (holding that “the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State 
has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense” after determining that that 
“actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment [and 
thus an actual sentence of imprisonment is the proper] line defining the constitutional right to 
appointment of counsel”). 
 
132 Id. at 372–73 (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 n.7 (1972)). 
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event that their sentence includes any confinement.133 In contrast, a defendant charged 
with a serious felony would not have a similar right in the odd event that the judge’s 
punishment did not include confinement. 
It is of course true that criminal adjudication is the only context in which this 
incarceration standard applies. However, the Supreme Court’s focus on incarceration as 
the trigger for the right of representation is indicative of perhaps a broader principle: 
zealous representation is an essential safeguard to protect the interests of individuals 
subjected to incarceration. Although not cast in terms of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, this principle was significant element in one of the rare Supreme Court 
decisions addressing the constitutionality of non-punitive preventive detention. In 
United States v. Salerno, the Court assessed the constitutionality of a preventive 
detention provision included within the Bail Reform Act of 1984.134 Salerno, an alleged 
high-level mafia leader, was pending trial for serious federal criminal offenses.135 
Pursuant to the authority provided by Congress in the Bail Reform Act, Salerno was 
subjected to preventive pretrial detention. The basis for this detention was not that 
Salerno represented a flight risk or danger to the judicial process (the traditional bases 
for depriving an individual charged with an offense of liberty prior to trial), but that he 
presented a threat of serious future criminal misconduct, proven by a preponderance of 
the evidence.136 
                                                 
133 See id. at 373. See also Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40 (“Under the rule we announce today, every judge will 
know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, even though local 
law permits it, unless the accused is represented by counsel”). 
 
134 481 U.S. 739 (1987). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1) (“If, after a hearing . . . the judicial officer finds that 
no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as 
required and the safety of any other person and the community, such judicial officer shall order the 
detention of the person before trial”); id. at (e)(2)–(3) (stating conditions that, if applicable to the instant 
case, create “a rebuttable presumption . . . that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably 
assure the safety of any other person and the community”). 
 
135 Specifically, Salerno and a codefendant were charged with 29 violations of the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Id. at 743. 
 
136 The Bail Reform Act provided that “[i]f, after a hearing . . . the judicial officer finds that no condition or 
combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety 
of any other person and the community, he shall order the detention of the person prior to trial.” 18 
U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). The Act also set forth criteria for the judicial officer to consider in making a pretrial 
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Salerno challenged the statute, asserting that the authorization for preventive 
pretrial detention based on risk of future criminal misconduct was inconsistent with the 
presumption of innocence and due. The Court rejected Salerno's challenge, holding that 
the act did not contravene the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.137 The Court's 
holding was based on both a substantive and procedural foundation. From a 
substantive due process perspective, the Court concluded that the normal process 
associated with criminal adjudication is triggered only when an individual is subjected 
to punitive detention, and not administrative detention.138 By characterizing the 
preventive detention authorized by the Bail Reform Act as non-punitive, the court 
effectively exempted the detention from the normal due process standards associated 
with incarceration.139 However, the Court emphasized the importance of providing for 
a meaningful adjudicative process before an individual may be subjected to non-
punitive detention.140 
The Court concluded that the process established for authorizing preventive 
detention pursuant to the Bail Reform Act met this process. That process included both 
                                                                                                                                                             
detainment decision, including the types of crimes to which the act applied, as well as a number of other 
factors: “the nature and seriousness of the charges, the substantiality of the Government’s evidence 
against the arrestee, the arrestee’s background and characteristics, and the nature and seriousness of the 
danger [to any person or to the community] posed by the suspect’s release.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 742–43 
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)). 
 
137 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750–51 (holding that “in circumstances where the government's interest is 
sufficiently weighty, [the individual’s strong interest in liberty may] be subordinated to the greater needs 
of society.”In application, “[w]hen the Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that an 
arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the community, we believe that, 
consistent with the Due Process Clause, a court may disable the arrestee from executing that threat”). 
 
138 See id. at 764 (comparing Salerno’s post-indictment pretrial administrative detention to lawful pre-
indictment administrative detention occurring prior to a probable cause hearing and determining that “a 
period of administrative detention may occur before the evidence of probable cause is presented to a 
neutral magistrate”) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)). 
 
139 See id. at 747 (“[T]he mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that 
the government has imposed punishment”). 
 
140 Id. at 751–52 (discussing the process required by the Bail Reform Act to justify a preventative 
detention). 
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an adversarial hearing and a right to counsel. The Court emphasized the significance of 
this process, and the ability of an individual subjected to preventive detention to test the 
government’s allegation in this adversarial process. Salerno therefore bolsters the 
assumption that it is the risk of incarceration, and not necessarily the punitive purpose 
for the incarceration, that implicates the critical importance of zealous representation. 
Part IV: Extending Legal Representation to the Long-Term Detention Process 
a. Adopting a Punitive/Administrative Divide in the War on Terror 
Providing counsel for an individual subjected to the risk a punitive incarceration 
is also a central component of the legitimacy of the U.S. military justice system. In fact, 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice exceeds the requirements of the Sixth Amendment 
by requiring defense counsel for any individual charged for trial by court-martial that 
may result in a federal criminal conviction.141 Even defendants who are not sentenced to 
punitive incarceration are entitled to the assistance of detailed military counsel, 
irrespective of their ability to pay for their own representation.142 
When President Bush issued the order for the creation of a military commission 
to try captured unlawful enemy combatants following the September 11th terrorist 
attacks, he adopted the same right to counsel rule applicable to courts-martial. That 
order included the requirement that military counsel be detailed to defend any 
individual charged for trial by military commission.143 Although this order, and the 
                                                 
141 The accused has the right to be represented by counsel during an investigation and at trial. Article 27 
provides the qualifications for trial counsel and defense counsel. Article 32 provides the right of an 
accused to be represented by counsel at investigation, and Article 38 provides the same right at trial. See 
10 U.S.C. §§ 827(a), 832(b), 838(b). Under the UCMJ, an accused does not have a right to be represented at 
a summary court-martial. However, these courts do not issue federal criminal convictions. Further, a 
defendant at a summary court-martial is provided free counsel to prepare for and appeal the results of 
the court-martial. See 10 U. S. C. §§ 838(b)(1), (c). 
 
142 See generally id. 
 
143 See DEPT. OF DEFENSE, MILITARY COMMISSION ORDER NO. 1 § 4(C) (Mar. 21, 2002). In Section 4(C), the 
DOD provides for defense of an accused at a military commission trial: 
(2) [T]he Chief Defense Counsel [defined in section 4(C)(1)] shall detail one or more 
Military Officers who are judge advocates of any United States armed force to conduct 
the defense for each case before a Commission (“Detailed Defense Counsel”). The duties 
of the Detailed Defense Counsel are: 
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military commission it created became the subject of substantial criticism and ultimate 
invalidation by the Supreme Court, the provision of legal representation was one bright 
spot in the commission process. The experienced and highly competent military defense 
lawyers detailed to this duty threw themselves into the task of defending their clients 
and identifying every conceivable flaw in the commission process. Their efforts were 
applauded by virtually all critics of the military commission, and ultimately resulted in 
not only successful challenges on behalf of their clients, but also to recognition by the 
American Civil Liberties Union.144 
For experts in military law, the efforts of these defense lawyers were 
unsurprising. Military lawyers, like their civilian counterparts, are taught to embrace 
the ethical obligation to zealously represent their clients, even when those clients are 
extremely unpopular. Within each military service, the Judge Advocate General (the 
senior legal officer for the service) has established a separate military defenders office. 
Military lawyers assigned to these organizations operate under a chain of command 
distinct from that of their prosecution counterparts, and are constantly reminded of the 
importance of their independent and zealous commitment to their clients.145  
                                                                                                                                                             
(a) To defend the Accused zealously within the bounds of the law without regard 
to personal opinion as to the guilt of the Accused; and 
(b) To represent the interests of the Accused in any review process as provided 
by this Order. . .  
Id. at § 4(C)(2)(a)–(b). Defendants in military commission trials were also given the right to replace their 
Detailed Defense Counsel with a different JAG lawyer, and could retain the services of a civilian attorney 
meeting certain defined qualifications. See id. at § 4(C)(3). While a defendant could replace one JAG 
defense attorney for another, the Order did not give defendants the right to proceed without any JAG 
defense counsel at all. See id. at § 4(C)(4) (“The Accused must be represented at all relevant times by 
Detailed Defense Counsel”). 
 
144 2007 Roger N. Baldwin Medal of Liberty Award, ACLU.ORG, http://www.aclu.org/2007-roger-n-
baldwin-medal-liberty-award (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (listing the five JAG officers, at least one from 
each branch of the armed forces, who received the award in 2005 for their defense of Guantanamo 
detainees). 
 
145  See Military Justice, Army Regulation 27-10 § 6-3 (Nov. 16, 2005), available at 
http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r27_10.pdf (last visited January 3, 2012). Chapter 6 of AR 27-12 
describes the United States Army Trial Defense Service (USATDS), which provides counsel to defendants 
in Army courts-martial. Section 6-3 describes the ultimate command structure of USATDS as follows:  
USATDS counsel are supervised, managed, and rated solely by their respective USATDS 
supervisory chain. Staff judge advocate and installation support responsibilities for TDS 
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For observers outside the military, however, the commitment of the military 
lawyers representing Guantanamo defendants charged with engaging in heinous acts of 
terror against United States seemed surprising. How could members of an institution 
charged with the responsibility of engaging in combat against these individuals devote 
themselves to such representation? The answer to this question is inherent in the 
concept of zealous representation. The lawyers assigned to these duties understood 
intuitively that by advocating on behalf of their clients they in no way endorsed their 
client’s cause.146 Instead, like all professional defense lawyers they recognized that their 
efforts would ultimately contribute to the credibility and legitimacy of justice dispensed 
by the military commission. 
The critical role of zealous representation in the military commission process 
would, ironically, be central to the downfall of the President’s commission. In Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court struck down the legality of the military commission 
                                                                                                                                                             
[Trial Defense Service] counsel . . . apply, regardless of the TDA [table of distribution and 
allowances] or modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE) authorization 
that the individual TDS counsel occupies. The Commander and Commandant, TJAGLCS 
[The Judge-Advocate General’s Legal Center and School], provide professional control 
and supervision of USATDS and its counsel, including UCMJ authority. The 
Commander, USALSA [U.S. Army Legal Services Agency], exercises other command 
functions for USATDS counsel . . .  
Id. at § 6-3. The USATDS as a whole is overseen by a Chief, designated by the Judge-Advocate General of 
the Army (TJAG). Id. at §6-3(a). Below the Chief are the Regional Defense Counsel (RDC), who is 
“[r]esponsible for the performance of the USATDS mission within a region [and] [t]he supervisor of all 
senior defense counsel within the region”; a region is “the major subordinate supervisory and control 
element of USATDS . . . encompass[ing] a geographical area designated by TJAG.” Id. at § 6-3(b), (c)(1). 
Below the RDC is the senior defense counsel, who is “responsible for the performance of the USATDS 
mission within the area serviced by a field office” as well as “the direct supervisor of all trial defense 
counsel within a field office [or its subsidiary branch offices.” Id. at § 6-3(f)(1). At the bottom of the 
hierarchy are trial defense counsel, whose job is “to represent Soldiers in courts-martial, administrative 
boards, and other proceedings and act as consulting counsel as required by law or regulations.” Id. at § 6-
3(g). The USATDS is therefore fully self-contained, and not subject to the supervisory control of a base 
commander, unlike JAG prosecutors; trial defense counsel and their superiors effectively report only to 
TJAG himself. This separate command structure is crucial to trial defense counsel’s ability to zealously 
represent defendants at courts-martial. 
 
146 Acceptance of this understanding permeates legal training at all levels. See AIR FORCE RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2005) (“A lawyer’s representation of a client, including representation by 
appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client’s economic, social, or moral views or 
activities”). 
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convened pursuant to Military Order Number 1.147 The issue that brought the case 
before the Court was a challenge to the rule permitting the exclusion of the defendant 
from the proceeding. While defendant's counsel would be present for all proceedings, 
the rule prohibited defense counsel from disclosing to the excluded client what 
transpired in his absence. The Supreme Court held that this rule violated both the 
minimum standards for fair process included within the Geneva Conventions and the 
procedural requirements of the Uniform Code of Military Justice applicable to military 
commissions.148 
Congress responded to the Hamdan decision with the Military Commission Act 
of 2006, its statutory resurrection of the military commission.149 Congress, like the 
President, provided for the appointment of military counsel for any individual charged 
for trial by the new commission. However, unlike the original commission, the MCA 
did not permit exclusion of the accused from court proceedings (except for good cause, 
such as disruption of the proceedings). Congress even added a right to a "learned" 
defense counsel for all capital cases. Like their pre-MCA counterparts, the military 
counsel detailed to defend unlawful enemy combatants at the military commission 
continue to embrace the highest standards of ethical performance. 
The provision of legal representation for individuals captured in the context of 
the Global War on Terror has, however, been restricted to the criminal prosecution 
context. No analogous provision had, prior to the 2011 NDAA, been extended to 
individuals subject to non-criminal preventive detention. Nonetheless, non-criminal 
detentions account for the vast majority of individuals subjected to wartime indefinite 
                                                 
147 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 
148 See id. at 630–631, 634–35 (holding Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applicable to the 
conflict with al Qaeda, and thus requiring Hamdan to be tried under a court constituted as Common 
Article 3 required. Additionally, the Court held that there was no “evident practical need” for military 
commission procedure to deviate from procedures applicable to courts-martial under the UCMJ) (citing 
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 646–48) (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also GPW, supra note 17, at art. 3(d) (prohibiting 
“the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions [against people who are hors de combat in 
armed conflicts not of an international character] without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly 
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples”) (emphasis added). 
 
149 See generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–49o. 
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detention power.150 And, as former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld noted when use of 
military commissions was initially announced, an acquittal by these tribunals would 
                                                 
150 As of January 2012, 172 detainees remained at Guantanamo, while about 600 had been transferred out; 
thus about 772 individuals have been detained at Guantanamo since 2001. See Carol Rosenberg, Why 
Obama hasn’t closed Guantanamo camps, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 7, 2012), 
www.miamiherald.com/2012/01/07/v-fullstory/2578082/why-obama-hasnt-closed-guantanamo.html (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2012) (stating that 172 men are still being detained at Guantanamo); Charles Savage, 
William Glaberson & Andrew W. Lehren, Classified Files Offer New Insights Into Detainees, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/25/world/guantanamo-files-lives-in-an-american-
limbo.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all (last visited Jan. 8, 2012) (stating that 600 detainees had been 
transferred to other countries as of April 2011 and that a total of 766 detainee assessments occurred at 
Guantanamo since 2001). At Bagram, near Kabul, Afghanistan, the number of prisoners has varied: 
around 450 detainees were at Bagram in July 2205; this number grew to 645 by September 2009 then 
shrank to 600 detainees by the time President Obama took office in January 2011; the number grew again 
to roughly 1700 in May 2011 and then to allegedly 3000 in November 2011. See Seth Doane & Phil 
Hirschkorn, Bagram: The other Guantanamo?, CBS NEWS (Nov. 13, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
18563_162-57323856/bagram-the-other-guantanamo/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2012); John Hanrahan, Bagram 
prison, bigger than Guantanamo, its prisoners in limbo, cries out for some news coverage, NIEMAN WATCHDOG 
(May 31, 2011), 
http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=background.view&backgroundid=00546  (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2012); American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Obtains List of Bagram Detainees (Jan. 15, 2010), 
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-obtains-list-bagram-detainees (last visited Jan. 8, 2012); Ron 
Synovitz, Afghanistan: Manhunt Continues For Four Suspected Al-Qaeda Fighters, RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO 
LIBERTY (July 12, 2005), http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1059859.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2012). By 
contrast, as of January 2010, only 11 individuals had been charged with violations of the laws of war or 
providing material support to terrorism by military commission; at least two of them (Benyam 
Mohammed and Mohamed Jawad) had all charges against them dropped, and two (David Hicks and 
Salim Hamdan; the latter was Osama bin Laden’s driver) were sentenced, served their sentences (and in 
the case of Hamdan, received over five years of time served from his detention), and were released to 
other countries. See also Ken Gude, Criminal Courts Are Tougher on Terrorists than Military Detention, 
CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Jan. 20, 2010), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/01/criminal_courts_terrorists.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2012) 
(noting that as of January 2010, “military commissions have only had one trial, negotiated one plea 
bargain, and convicted one defendant after he boycotted the proceedings” since their formation in 
November 2001, and further noting that the military commission trial of Hamdan—the only man since 
2001 to truly stand trial by U.S. military commission—“resulted in a split verdict—the military jury 
acquitted him of conspiracy and returned a guilty verdict only on the charge of material support for 
terrorism”). For a full list of individuals with causes charged or dismissed by a military commission, see 
Military Commissions Cases, http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx (last visited Jan. 5, 
2012). 
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not necessarily result in release of detainees.151 Instead, it was more probable an 
acquitted detainee would simply be returned to non-punitive preventive detention.152 
The almost inevitable reality of indefinite detention has, however, spurred a 
credible effort to enhance to the preventive detention process. This effort first focused 
on Guantanamo – initially in response to the Supreme Court’s extension of habeas 
jurisdiction to Guantanamo detainees and the Court’s suggestion that enhanced process 
might eliminate the necessity for judicial review.153 The Court would ultimately 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
151 During a news briefing on March 28, 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made the following 
statements regarding detainee acquittal before a military commission and possible release following 
acquittal: 
There have been some murmurs in the media about detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, 
and specifically whether if one who is tried by a military commission and, if acquitted, 
whether they would then be released or whether they would still be detained . . . If one 
were to be acquitted by a commission of . . . a specific criminal charge, that would not 
necessarily change the fact that that individual remains an enemy who was captured 
during an armed conflict, and therefore one who could reasonably be expected to go back 
to his terrorist ways if released . . . In some cases it might not be possible to establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual committed a particular crime, and 
therefore he might be acquitted of that crime. However, it does not change the fact that 
he is an enemy combatant. He may be guilty of other crimes, but at the minimum he is 
someone to be kept off the battlefield . . . Even in a case where an enemy combatant 
might be acquitted, the United States would be irresponsible not to continue to detain 
them until the conflict is over. Detaining enemy combatants for the duration of a conflict 
is universally recognized as responsible and lawful. This is fully consistent with the 
Geneva Conventions and other war authorities. 
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense News Briefing (Mar. 28, 2002), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3380. 
  
152 See id. 
 
153 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), superseded by statute, 
Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 7(a), Pub.L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006), as recognized in Al 
Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). In Hamdi, the a plurality of the Court held that Hamdi, as 
an American citizen, had a right to challenge his detention; however, the Court limited the resources due 
to Hamdi in doing so while noting that at least some core constitutional protections must be preserved 
and made available: 
[W]hile the full protections that accompany challenges to detentions in other settings 
may prove unworkable and inappropriate in the enemy-combatant setting, the threats to 
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backtrack on this suggestion when it held in Boumediene v. Bush that the process 
implemented by the President did not sufficiently protect the rights of Guantanamo 
detainees, who were therefore constitutionally entitled to challenge their detention by 
writ of habeas corpus.154 However, by that time, the process established by order of the 
Secretary of Defense had been endorsed and enhanced by Congress in the form of the 
Detainee Treatment Act (as supplemented by the Military Commission Act). 
The combined effect of executive, legislative, and judicial action led to a military 
detention review hearing to determine who qualifies for indefinite detention at 
Guantanamo (the Combatant Status Review Tribunal), an annual review by military 
authorities to determine if continued detention remains justified (called the Annual 
Review Board until March 2011), and judicial review of military detention decisions by 
the District of Columbia District and Circuit Courts. While this process has resulted in 
the reclassification of a number of detainees,155 legal representation is provided only 
                                                                                                                                                             
military operations posed by a basic system of independent review are not so weighty as 
to trump a citizen’s core rights to challenge meaningfully the Government’s case and to 
be heard by an impartial adjudicator. 
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535. On the same day that the Court handed down Hamdi, it released its opinion in 
Rasul, holding that individuals detained at Guantanamo were entitled to challenge their detention by 
filing statutorily-authorized writs of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia. See Rasul, 524 U.S. at 485. In holding that the principles set forth in Johnson v. Eisentrager did 
not apply to the U.S. facility at Guantanamo, the Court considered the historical reach of habeas corpus in 
ultimately determining that 
[a]pplication of the habeas statute to persons detained at the base is consistent with the 
historical reach of the writ of habeas corpus. At common law, courts exercised habeas 
jurisdiction over the claims of aliens detained within sovereign territory of the realm, as 
well as the claims of persons detained in the so-called “exempt jurisdictions,” where 
ordinary writs did not run, and all other dominions under the sovereign's control. 
Id. at 481–82 (citations omitted). See also 28 U. S. C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3) (granting federal district courts 
statutory authority to hear habeas claims asserted by any person “within their respective jurisdictions” 
who claims to be held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 
States”).  
 
154 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 
155 See Dep’t of Defense, Combatant Status Review Tribunal Summary (Feb. 10, 2009), 
http://www.defense.gov/news/csrtsummary.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2012); Stuck in Guantanamo, INT’L 
HERALD TRIBUNE (Apr. 22, 2006), 
http://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/articles/2006/04/21/news/gitmo/php (stating that as of April 
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when cases reach Article III judicial review on writs of habeas corpus. Prior to the 
President’s March 2011 Executive order, no legal representation was provided to 
detainees before either the CSRT or the ARB. Instead, in an apparent analogy to the 
procedures established by the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War156 for resolving uncertainty as to whether a captive qualifies as a 
prisoner of war, detainees were provided with a U.S. military officer to serve as a non-
legal representative at the CSRT (the ARB was a “paper” review so no representation is 
provided).157 
An analogous evolution of detention review procedure has occurred at the U.S. 
detention facility in Bagram, Afghanistan.158 Ironically, while Guantanamo has been the 
focal point of the majority of scrutiny, the Bagram/Parwan operation accounts for the 
vast majority of individuals who have and continue to be subjected to preventive 
detention by the United States.159 However, a serious effort to revise the detention 
process in order to mitigate the risk of invalid detentions has only recently been 
                                                                                                                                                             
2006, the ARBs had determined that while three detainees could be released and 107 could be repatriated 
to the custody of their home countries, all still remained detained in Guantanamo at that time). 
 
156 See GPW, supra note 17, at art. 5 (granting detainees whose POW status is in question “the protection of 
the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal”). 
 
157 See CSRT Order, supra note 82, at ¶ (c) (describing the nature of the detainee’s non-legal personal 
representative). See generally CSRT Procedures, supra note 82, at Encl. (1); ARB Procedures, supra note 89, 
at Encl. (3)–(4). See also GPW, supra note 17, at art. 5 (“Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, 
having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the 
categories enumerated in Article, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until 
such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal”). 
 
158 See discussion supra Part I.B.c. 
 
159 In early 2008, around 630 individuals were detained at Bagram, compared to the 275 at Guantanamo. 
Andrew Gumbal, Bagram Detention Centre Now Twice the Size of Guantanamo, THE INDEPENDENT, Jan. 8, 
2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/bagram-detention-centre-now-twice-the-size-of-
guantanamo-768803.html. By 2011, Bagram housed over 1700 detainees: almost triple the number 
detained there in 2008 at the end of the Bush Administration. Justin Elliott, The Gitmo No One Talks About, 
SALON, June 4, 2011, http://www.salon.com/2011/06/04/bagram_obama_gitmo/. As of May 2011, only 171 
detainees were still at Guantanamo. Sky News, Afghan Inmate Dies at Guantanamo in ‘Suicide’, May 19, 
2011, http://news.sky.com/home/world-news/article/15994893. 
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implemented. As will be explained in the next section, this effort resulted in a process 
analogous to the CSRT process at Guantanamo. While this has undoubtedly improved 
the credibility of the U.S. detention operation and added substantial protections to 
potential detainees, like their Guantanamo counterparts DoD did not provided legal 
representation as part of this revision. Instead, an approach analogous to the ‘prisoner’s 
representative’ approach in the GPW was extended to Afghanistan.160  
Before turning to an overview of the revisions to the detainee review process, a 
brief discussion of the flaw in the GPW analogy is in order. As one of the authors has 
previously written, while it is common to invoke the limited process afforded to 
prisoners of war pursuant to the GPW as a justification of limiting procedural rights for 
unprivileged belligerents, this argument is fundamentally flawed.161 A POW and an 
                                                 
160 The term “prisoners’ representative” is used in several articles of the Third Geneva Convention. 
Prisoners’ representatives under the Prisoner of War Convention are appointed in one of the following 
ways: (1) if the detainment camp consists solely of officers or a mix of officers and non-officers, the 
“senior officer among the prisoners of war shall be recognized as the camp prisoners’ representative”; or 
(2) if there are no officers among the POWs, “the prisoners shall freely elect by secret ballot, every six 
months, and also in case of vacancies, prisoners’ representatives.” GPW, supra note 17, at art. 79. The duty 
of the prisoner representatives is to “represent[] [prisoners] before the military authorities, the Protecting 
Powers, the International Committee of the Red Cross and any other organization which may assist 
them,” and to ensure that the representative actually represents the interests of the relevant group, a 
prisoner representative must “have the same nationality, language and customs as the prisoners of war 
whom he represents.” Id. 
 
161 See Geoffrey S. Corn, Enemy Combatants and Access to Habeas Corpus: Questioning the Validity of the 
Prisoner of War Analogy, 5 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 236, 249 (2007). The relevant portion of this article 
discusses the process for POW determination: POW determinations under the Prisoner of War 
Convention are made pursuant to an Article 5 tribunal applying the POW status qualification criteria 
established by Article 4, but Article 4 is itself unreachable unless Article 2 applies to the armed conflict in 
which the individual was captured. See id. See also GPW, supra note 17, at art. 2 (“the present Convention 
shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or 
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them”) (emphasis 
added). As the author describes, Article 2 applicability—the predicate requirement for applying Article 4 
POW criteria at an Article 5 status tribunal, and the predicate for even requiring such a tribunal in the 
first place—requires an “inter-state dispute[] involving the intervention of armed forces. Accordingly, 
Article 4 is never applicable in any other kind of armed conflict.” Corn, supra note 166, at 248 (citations 
omitted). As the author noted, the fact that the United States is not in an armed conflict with another 
sovereign nation, but instead is combating a transnational non-state entity,  
is the principal basis for the United States’ determination that captured al Qaeda warriors 
are conclusively presumed to be excluded from POW status. Although the armed conflict 
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unprivileged belligerent do share the common consequences of their belligerency and 
capture: preventive detention for the duration of hostilities. However, beyond this the 
analogy between these two categories of wartime detainees dissipates. POW status is 
defined by treaty, and therefore the procedural protections established by the GPW for 
POWs are premised on the underlying assumption that the individuals accorded those 
protections fall into a clearly defined category. As a result, these protections are not 
focused primarily on resolving the complex question of whether a captive should or 
should not be subjected to preventive detention, but instead on ensuring that the rights 
established by the treaty are respected by the detaining power. Even Article 5 of the 
GPW – the only provision of the treaty addressing a status determination procedure – 
reflects this reality. The function of the Article 5 tribunal is to merely apply the 
established Article 4 status qualification criterion.162 As a result, it is intended to be a 
                                                                                                                                                             
that the United States asserts exists between this transnational organization and the 
United States is international in scope, there is not even a credible argument that al 
Qaeda satisfies the requirements necessary to be considered a state. While it is plausible 
that such personnel might have been associated with the armed conflict between the 
United States and Afghanistan during the initial phases of Operation Enduring Freedom, 
so long as the United States persists in treating the armed conflict with al Qaeda as 
distinct from armed conflicts with sponsoring states, the predicate requirement of “right 
kind of conflict” cannot be satisfied. Accordingly, personnel captured in association with 
this armed conflict do not benefit from the provision of the Prisoner of War Convention. 
Assuming, however, that the initial “right kind of conflict” requirement is satisfied, the 
second requirement that individuals captured during such a conflict meet the Article 4 
POW qualification criteria, or that the individual detainee is the “right kind of person,” 
still must be met. 
Id. at 248–50 (citations omitted). The author continues in asserting that Article 4 criteria have not be met 
by al Qaeda forces in the past, because their organization, lack of a fixed distinctive sign or emblem, 
failure to openly carry arms and, arguably most important, disregard for conducting their operations in 
accordance with the laws and customs of war, prevent such warriors from being classified as POWs 
under the Third Geneva Convention. See id. at 250–52. See also GPW, supra note 17, at art. 4 (setting forth 
criteria which, if met and proved at an Article 5 hearing, require a captured individual to continue to 
receive POW status). 
 
162 The Prisoner of War Convention defines the following individuals as POWs: 
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias 
or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. 
(2) Members of other militias and . . . other volunteer corps . . . provided that such 
[organizations] fulfill the conditions of . . . being commanded by a person responsible for 
his subordinates . . . having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance . . . carrying 
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summary, non-adversarial process. The role of the prisoner’s representative is therefore 
not to serve as an advocate for the detainee subjected to the status determination, but 
instead to monitor the proceeding in order to facilitate raising concerns about the 
process to the Protecting Power – the entity responsible for monitoring compliance with 
the treaty and bringing alleged violations to the attention of the detaining power.163 
Beyond the analogous preventive detention consequence of their belligerency, 
the situation of an unprivileged belligerent is fundamentally distinct from that of a 
POW. Unlike the POW, there is no internationally accepted definition of this status, and 
certainly no treaty based definition.164 In fact, it is unclear whether consensus on such a 
                                                                                                                                                             
arms openly . . . [and] conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and 
customs of war. 
(3) Members of regular armed forces professing allegiance to a government or an 
authority not recognized by the Detaining Power. 
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof . . . 
provided they have received authorization[] from the armed forces which they 
accompany . . . 
(5) Members of crews . . . of the merchant marine and . . . civil aircraft of the Parties to the 
conflict . . . 
(6) Inhabitants of non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy 
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having time to form 
themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the 
laws and customs of war. 
GPW, supra note 17, at art. 4(A). Two other classifications of individuals are also treated as POWs. See id. 
at art. 4(B).  
 
163 See id. at art. 79, 80 (“[P]risoners’ representatives [are] entrusted with representing [the prisoners they 
represent] before the military authorities, the Protecting Powers, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross and any other organization which may assist them”; “[p]risoners’ representatives shall further the 
physical, spiritual and intellectual well-being of prisoners of war”). 
 
164 See David L. Franklin, Enemy Combatants and the Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1001, 
1032–33 (2008) (discussing how the Supreme Court noted the internationally-accepted distinctions 
between lawful and unlawful combatants in Quirin and recognized spies and saboteurs as combatants 
typically ineligible for POW status, and further considering that the Supreme Court in Hamdi “observed 
that there is disagreement about the appropriate scope of the term ‘enemy combatant,’ and noted that ‘the 
government has never provided any court with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as 
such.’” However, despite the Hamdi court accepting an “as-applied” definition of “enemy combatant” for 
Hamdi and Congress broadly defining “enemy combatant” in the MCA, there has been no international 
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definition even exists between the three branches of the U.S. government. From the 
inception of the U.S. war on terror preventive detention practice, the definition of who 
may properly be subjected to preventive detention has vexed the government.165 At the 
                                                                                                                                                             
consensus on “the precise boundary between combatants and civilians . . . in the present context of 
terrorism and asymmetrical warfare”) (citations omitted). 
 
165 See WITTES, supra note 49, at 16–17. The positions of the Bush and Obama Administration positions are 
somewhat different, but arguably the Obama Administration’s decision to cease justifying detention 
authority on inherent Article II powers is, in part, due to the courts’ unwillingness to recognize inherent 
Article II detention powers broader than the powers described by the AUMF:  
The Bush administration asserted that both Article II of the Constitution and the 
September 18, 2001, Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) gave it the power 
to detain for the duration of hostilities both members and supporters of entities—
including Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and “associated forces”—that are engaged in hostilities 
against the United States or its allies. The Supreme Court partially upheld this claim in 
Hamdi. A plurality of the Court determined in that case that the AUMF implicitly 
conferred the “traditional incidents” of lawful warfare on American operations, that 
these incidents included the power to detain enemy fighters in at least some 
circumstances, and that this authority would apply at least to a person who bore arms for 
the Taliban in Afghanistan. This holding obviously left open the question of whether the 
AUMF (or Article II, for that matter) similarly provided for such non-criminal detention 
of persons captured in other circumstances. Less obviously, it also left open a set of 
difficult issues concerning what it means to be a “member” or “part” of any of these 
organizations, at least some of which are better characterized as loose associational 
networks than as hierarchical organizations . . . In March 2009, however, the Obama 
administration filed a brief in the Hamlily habeas litigation that departed only in three 
relatively-minor ways from the Bush administration’s earlier approach. First, the new 
administration asserted that henceforth its claim to detention authority would rest on the 
AUMF, rather than on any claim of inherent Article II power, and that its AUMF-based 
authority ought to be construed in accordance with the laws of war. Second, the Obama 
administration dropped the label “enemy combatant” in favor of the less provocative 
practice of referring simply to persons detainable pursuant to the AUMF. These moves, 
notably, have not generated particular controversy among the district court judges. 
Those who have explicitly addressed the source-of-authority issue appear to accept that 
the proper frame of reference is indeed the AUMF. And no judge thus far has suggested 
that the government may have broader authority by virtue of any inherent Article II 
arguments. Nor has any expressed doubt that the AUMF provides at least some form of 
detention authority. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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outset, the definition adopted by the President was similar to the ”you know it when 
you see it” definition of pornography. For individuals subjected to detention in the 
early months of the Global War on Terror, the definition was in effect ”you know it 
when President Bush sees it.” The Department of Defense then adopted its own 
definition when it established the CSRT.166  Subsequently, Congress adopted a slightly 
different definition by implication when it defined who could be subjected to trial by 
military commission as the result of being an unlawful enemy combatant.167  In addition 
to these various definitions, the judiciary has developed its own definition for purpose 
of habeas corpus litigation.168 None of these definitions, however, reflect the clarity of 
                                                 
166 See generally CSRT Order, supra note 82 (establishing the procedure of the CSRT hearing and the 
qualifications, roles, and responsibilities of the hearing officers, reporter, detainee personal 
representative, and outlining the manner in which the detainee could participate in the CSRT process). 
 
167 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, (2006); 10 U. S. C. § 948d (2009). 
 
168 See WITTES, supra note 49, at 17–21. As noted in the article, there are up to four distinct judicial 
definitions of detainability, three of which have been espoused by District Court judges and one of which 
was presented by the D.C. Court of Appeals. The most widely-accepted detainment position is based on 
Hamlily and, summarized, states that while the “AUMF confers authority on the executive branch to 
detain members of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces . . . independent support—even if 
substantial—[cannot] provide a distinct ground for detention.” Id. at 18 (citing Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. 
Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009)). However, the judge in Hamlily emphasized “that there are ‘no settled criteria’ 
for identifying formal membership in Al Qaeda” and thus “courts must be open to proof of functional 
membership.” Id. (quoting Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 75–76. The judge in Hamlily thus noted that “[t]he 
‘key inquiry,’ in all events, is ‘whether the individual functions or participates within or under the 
command structure of the organization—i.e., whether he receives and executes orders or directions.’” Id. 
(quoting Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 75). This position has received the most support among the district 
judges in the D.C. Circuit, but other judges have reinterpreted even this “most widely-accepted” 
definition. To summarize the Hamlily definition and describe a reinterpretation:  
Hamlily . . . precludes detention of entirely-independent actors who happen to provide 
support to Al Qaeda, but it considers acts of support to be relevant evidence of functional 
membership as long as the government can establish an element of direction and control 
in the relationship between the group and the individual. Subsequently, at least four 
other judges—Hogan, Robertson, Kollar-Kotelly, and Lamberth—have expressly adopted 
this interpretation. A fifth judge—Urbina—likewise has expressly adopted the Hamlily 
definition, but his actual application of the test suggests that he may have in mind 
something more restrictive than the other judges. In Hatim v. Obama, Judge Ricardo 
Urbina adopts the Hamlily standard but then goes on to address the sufficiency of the 
government’s attempt to satisfy that standard by proving that the detainee had attended 
Al Qaeda’s Al Farouq training camp. In that context, he states that even if the 
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government could prove that the petitioner attended that camp and that he understood 
that he thereby became part of the “al-Qaida apparatus,” the government’s burden 
would still require it to present evidence to the effect that he had actually received and 
executed orders from Al Qaeda and thereby “participated” in its command structure, 
rather than simply received its training. It may be that the other judges subscribing to 
Hamlily would take the same view, but it seems more likely that this entails a degree of 
engagement beyond what most or all of them have in mind under the heading of 
functional membership. 
WITTES, supra note 49, at 17–18 (quoting Hatim v. Obama, No. 05-1429, slip op. at 19–20 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 
2009)). The second definitional position, from Gherebi, tracks the Administration’s support for the notion 
that “either membership or substantial support can trigger detention authority” but that the authority 
“’encompass[es] only individuals who were members of the enemy organization’s armed forces, as that 
term is intended under the laws of war, at the time of their capture.’” WITTES, supra note 49, at 19 (quoting 
Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 70–71 (D.D.C. 2009)). The article notes that  
[w]hether this approach truly differs from the Hamlily approach depends, of course, on 
whether one thinks that the concept of membership under the laws of war would 
encompass the “functional membership” scenario. 
WITTES, supra note 49, at 19. The third position, first expressed in the Boumediene case on remand from the 
Supreme Court, is simply Judge Leon’s express adoption of the Bush Administration’s detainability 
definition, which allows detainment of “both members and supporters of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and 
associated forces.” WITTES, supra note 49, at 20 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 135–36 
(D.D.C. 2008)). However, when presented with the Obama Administration’s more limited definition, 
Judge Leon has yet to “subsequently confront[] a petition that would require him to accept or reject the 
government’s continuing claim of authority to detain on grounds of support alone”; Judge Leon even 
appeared to “express[] some degree of impatience with the effort by the Obama administration to narrow 
modestly the scope of its detention authority.” WITTES, supra note 49, at 20 (quoting Al Ginco v. Obama, 
626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 127 (D.D.C. 2009)). Finally, the fourth position, first presented by a 2-1 panel of the 
D.C. Circuit in Al Bihani, “construes the AUMF to support not just the narrower support ground the 
Obama administration favors, but also the original Bush administration variant—in which support did 
not necessarily have to qualify as substantial” in order for the support to justify detention. WITTES, supra 
note 49, at 20 (citing Al Bihani v. Obama, No. 09-5051, slip op. at 8 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 5, 2010)). While the 
petitioner argued that an interpretation of the AUMF allowing for military commission trials and 
detainment of persons materially supporting hostilities stands in conflict with the detention authority of 
the law of armed conflict, the majority stated that the law of armed conflict was “’not a source of 
authority for U.S. courts’ and cannot be construed ‘as extra-textual limiting principles for the President’s 
war powers under the AUMF.’” WITTES, supra note 49, at 21 (citing Al Bihani,  No. 09-5051, slip op. at 8–
9).  
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the Article 4 POW definition.169 Terms like “materially” or “substantially” supported 
involve a high degree of subjective interpretation, and the scope of detention authority 
continues to this day to be an area of uncertainty. 
This definitional uncertainty undermines the legitimacy of a broad-based 
analogy to the GPW when assessing the extent of procedural protections that should be 
provided to unprivileged belligerent detainees. For these detainees belligerent status 
determinations involve far more complexity than the determination of prisoner of war 
status. As noted above, the standard pursuant to which they will be detained is less 
clear than that applicable to POWs. This in turn leads to a very different evidentiary 
equation. For individuals brought before an Article 5 tribunal to determine whether 
they qualify as POWs, the evidentiary focus is almost exclusively on indicia of 
connection to a defined enemy armed force.170 Thus, it is information related to 
uniform, equipment, and capture in the proximity of clearly identified enemy personnel 
that provides significant probative value. In contrast, the evidentiary focus for 
determining unprivileged belligerent status is often much more nuanced. Information 
related to associations, activities, and state of mind is normally far more significant than 
uniform or other traditional indicia of belligerent status. As a result, simply extending 
the procedural construct of the GPW - or and more specifically of the Article 5 tribunal - 
to status determinations that will result in indefinite detention of unprivileged enemy 
belligerents is both unjustified and inefficient. Instead, as reflected by the lessons 
learned in the decade since the U.S. began detaining individuals based on this status, a 
hybrid process is needed to balance the legitimate interests of preventive detention with 
the equally legitimate liberty interest of individuals improperly swept up in an 
overzealous point of capture detention effort. 
                                                 
169 See generally GPW, supra note 17, at art. 4 (specifically defining categories of persons to be considered 
prisoners of war and thus protected under the Third Geneva Convention). 
 
170An Article 5 hearing under the Third Convention occurs solely to determine whether any of the Article 
4 definitions apply to the subject of the hearing; if one does not, the subject should not be considered a 
POW and will not be protected by the Third Convention. See id. Note that under Article 5, a detaining 
Power must presume that and act as if a captured belligerent qualifies as a POW protected by the Third 
Convention unless and until the Article 5 tribunal finds otherwise (i.e. that the individual does not fit into 
any Article 4 category). See id. (“persons . . . [who] hav[e] committed a belligerent act and hav[e] fallen 
into the hands of the enemy . . . shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as 
their status [under Article 4] has been determined . . . ”). 
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This lesson has recently been manifested in the U.S. revision of the detention 
review process in Parwan, Afghanistan. As a work in progress, this effort has produced 
a substantial improvement in the overall detention operation in Afghanistan. As will be 
summarized in the next section, these revisions established a quasi-adversarial process 
and recognize the importance of providing detainees with representation in that 
process. However, the individuals assigned with this responsibility are not lawyers, but 
instead lay U.S. military officers, calling into question the effectiveness of the overall 
revision effort.  
b. Questioning the Efficacy of Non-Legal Representation 
 Referencing Supreme Court right to counsel jurisprudence in no way suggests 
that the author’s propose extending that right to unprivileged enemy belligerents. Such 
a proposal would ignore the unquestionable fact that only initiation of formal 
adversarial criminal process triggers that right, a trigger not implicated by preventive 
wartime detentions and unaffected by detainee nationality.  Instead, this reference is 
intended to highlight an underlying tenet of this jurisprudence: the indelible link 
between protecting individuals facing the risk of a deprivation of liberty and the lawyer 
ethos of zealous representation.  That risk permeates the punitive and preventive 
detention process, a risk that justifies questioning the wisdom of limiting legal 
representation to only one of these contexts. 
 The Supreme Court’s right to counsel cases reveal two important principles: first, 
lawyers, by virtue of their ethical obligation and professional culture, possess a unique 
capacity to zealously represent even the most reviled objects of societal scorn; second, 
bringing that zealousness to bear is essential to protect the interests of individuals 
subjected to confinement.171 While our legal culture normally associates such 
                                                 
171 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The Supreme Court discussed how the opportunity for a 
defendant o be heard is meaningless without the opportunity to be represented by a person trained in the 
law, and that such a denial amounts to a denial of constitutionally-mandated due process: 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the 
right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and 
sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, 
of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with 
the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a 
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the 
issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to 
prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of 
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, 
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confinement with the criminal process, recent decisions of the Court have extended the 
requirement of zealous legal representation beyond that context to situations of 
preventive non-punitive detention.172 
 These two vectors – a limited trigger for the right to counsel and the significance 
of liberty interest implicated by any form of confinement - create a gray area for any 
meaningful analysis of the protections that should be afforded to individuals subject to 
wartime preventive detention as unprivileged belligerents. Wartime captives have not 
historically been provided legal representation in the detention determination process.  
Instead, as noted earlier in this article, assistance has traditionally come in the form of a 
lay prisoner’s representative.  This history arguably supports the practice of providing 
lay representation for detainees. However, the consequence of the status determination 
made by the review tribunals established to assess detainability of alleged unprivileged 
belligerents clearly implicates the same concerns implicated by the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel, and the extension of that right to the non-punitive detention processes 
the Supreme Court has recently endorsed. In fact, the consequence of a wartime 
detention decision is potentially more profound than that related to punitive 
incarceration.173 Unlike the criminal context, the detention of unprivileged belligerents 
                                                                                                                                                             
he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his 
innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant 
and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect. If in any case, civil of criminal, a state or federal 
court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing 
for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of a 
hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the constitutional sense. 
Id. at 68–69. 
 
172 See, e.g,. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742, 751–52 (1987) (holding constitutional the 1984 Bail 
Reform Act’s provisions regarding pretrial preventive detention, in part because of the Act’s procedural 
safeguards, including a right to counsel at the administrative detention hearing); United States v. 
Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1954 (2010) (holding constitutional the Adam Walsh Child Protection and 
Safety Act, which in part authorizes a federal district court to order the civil commitment of a mentally ill 
and sexually-dangerous federal prisoner beyond the date the prisoner would otherwise be released from 
incarceration; the statute provides that at the commitment hearing, the prisoner “’shall be represented by 
counsel.’” Id. (citations omitted)). 
 
173 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (discussing the process due under a CSRT and stating that 
“[a]lthough we make no judgment whether the CSRTs, as currently constituted, satisfy due process 
standards, we agree . . . that, even when all the parties involved in this process act with diligence and in 
good faith, there is considerable risk of error in the tribunal’s findings of fact”). 
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in is not for a defined period, but is as close to indefinite detention as in any other 
imaginable context.174 
 It is clear that this perceived consequence of indefinite detention was a 
significant motivation for the important and credible revisions to the detention review 
process implemented to date.  It is equally clear that Congress has recognized the 
importance of legal representation for individuals subjected to this process. 
Collectively, these developments confirm that individual representation is an important 
component in mitigating the risk of erroneous status determinations, thereby increasing 
the probability of factually justified detention decisions. What is less clear is whether 
the consequence of relying on non-lawyers to provide this representation has been 
adequately assessed or critiqued.175 Ultimately, the shift away from the lay 
representative model reflected in the NDAA implicates potentially significant 
cost/benefit considerations. It is to these considerations the article will now turn. 
c. The Potential Benefits of Legal Representation 
Lawyers play a unique role in any adversarial or quasi-adversarial process. In 
many ways, that role mirrors the role of the soldier on the field of battle. Both the 
soldier and the lawyer are inculcated with an ethos of aggressive execution of the 
mission. For the soldier, this is reflected in the values of duty and selfless-service. For 
the lawyer, it is reflected in the ethical duty of zealousness. Irrespective of the label 
placed on the duty, the effect is the same. Both the soldier and the lawyer perform their 
duties on behalf of a ‘client’; both the soldier and the lawyer are expected to execute 
their duties tirelessly and aggressively within the limits of the rules that regulate their 
respective battles; and both the soldier and the lawyer understand that it is not their 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
174 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (“If the Government does not consider this 
unconventional war won for two generations, and if it maintains during that time that Hamdi might, if 
released, rejoin forces fighting against the United States, then the position it has taken throughout the 
litigation of this case suggests that Hamdi’s detention could last for the rest of his life”). 
 
175 See id. at 767, 787 (noting that a detainee’s personal representative is not a lawyer and explicitly not 
even a lay advocate, and while discussing how General Yamashita and the defendants in Quirin were 
provided with legal representation, also stating that those proceedings were adversarial in nature, where 
Boumediene’s CSRT was considered an administrative proceeding, not an adversarial proceeding). 
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role to question of the mission assigned by the client, but instead to fight within the 
limits of the rules to accomplish that mission.176 
This last aspect of the analogy between the soldier and the lawyer is perhaps 
most significant to truly understand the importance of the zealous representation ethos. 
Lawyers possess a unique ability to embrace their duty on behalf the most vilified 
objects of state action.177 Exemplified by the likes of John Adams,178 Sam Leibowitz179 
and Kenneth Royall,180 this ability is central to the credibility of the adversarial process. 
                                                 
176 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2. Rule 1.2 concerns the scope of representation and 
demarcates the sharing of authority between the attorney and client: 
[A] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation 
and . . . shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A 
lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out 
the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter. 
In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after consultation with 
the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client 
will testify. 
Id. at 1.2(a). A common axiom is that the client makes strategic decisions (i.e. what plea to enter) while the 
lawyer makes tactical decisions (i.e. determining the order of witnesses called, deciding what evidence to 
offer). However, this is not entirely accurate, as the lawyer’s tactical decision-making is tempered by the 
client’s overall strategic control (i.e. the client may tell the lawyer not to call a certain witness or not to 
offer certain evidence; the lawyer must abide by these decisions). 
 
177 This acceptance of duty is sometimes codified into Rules of Professional Conduct, perhaps in part to 
remind lawyers that no matter their personal disagreements with their clients’ lifestyles, that everyone is 
entitled to zealous representation. See, e.g., AIR FORCE RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2005) (“A 
lawyer’s representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an 
endorsement of the client’s economic, social, or moral views or activities”).  
 
178 See supra note 12. 
 
179 See supra note 13 
 
180 Kenneth Claiborne Royall was a colonel in the United States Army during World War II. In 1942, he 
was appointed by President Roosevelt to defend the Nazis captured during Operation Pastorius – also 
known as the defendants in Ex parte Quirin. Though Royall was ordered to defend the Nazis before a 
military tribunal, he believed that the President did not have the authority to convene a secret military 
court to try his clients, and appealed to the federal courts, arguing that the military commission was 
unconstitutional. Royall represented the defendants at the Supreme Court, and though the Court held in 
favor of the President’s order, he had succeeded in obtaining independent civilian judicial review for his 
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The defense bar prides itself on its unapologetic commitment to individuals who 
although legally presumed innocent are often obviously factually guilty. Accepting the 
approbation of the public – a public that is often incapable of truly understanding either 
the nature of the lawyer’s duty or its contribution to legitimacy – is an integral part of 
their obligation. Lawyers understand that without that zealous commitment to the 
client the adversarial system cannot properly function, and as the Supreme Court 
reminds us periodically, the distortion produced by an absence of such representation 
fundamentally undermines the entire concept of justice.181 
Ensuring a balanced adversarial process that produces a credible result therefore 
requires more than merely competing representatives; it requires representatives fully 
committed to the adversarial competition. The assumption that lay representatives are 
capable of such commitment is highly questionable in the abstract, and even more so in 
the context of a review process charged with determining whether to release an 
individual alleged to be an enemy belligerent. In the abstract, asking a lay-person to 
embrace the cause of target of state accusation – even in relation to a non-punitive 
allegation – is inconsistent with the normal assumption that accusation suggests guilt 
(that this assumption is normal is reflected in the universal admonition to jurors in 
                                                                                                                                                             
clients. Royall later served as the last Secretary of War in 1947, and then as the first Secretary of the Army 
until 1949. See Nathan Williams, What Happened to the 8 Germans Tried by a Military Court in World War II, 
HISTORY NEWS NETWORK (July 8, 2002), http://hnn.us/articles/431.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2012); Kenneth 
Claiborne Royall, U.S. ARMY, http://www.history.army.mil/books/Sw-SA/Royall.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 
2012). See also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 
181 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (holding that “the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel exists, and is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial” and noting that “the 
Court has recognized that ‘the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel’”) 
(citations omitted). In its jurisprudence, the Court has enumerated the requirements for a fair trial and 
repeatedly emphasized that, with regard to the right to counsel, 
a fair trial is one in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an 
impartial tribunal for resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding. The right 
to counsel plays a crucial role in the adversarial system embodied in the Sixth 
Amendment, since access to counsel’s skill and knowledge is necessary to accord 
defendants the “ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution” to which they 
are entitled. 
Id. at 685.  
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criminal cases that they may not consider the accusation of a defendant as evidence of 
guilt).182 In the detainee status context, the difficulty is exponentially increased.  
Zealous representation of detainees by lay military officers requires commitment 
to protect the interests of an alleged enemy operative. This in itself is problematic. How 
can a member of the U.S. armed forces be expected to embrace the interests of an 
individual captured by his colleagues and detained based on an initial determination of 
belligerent conduct?183 It is difficult to imagine a more unattractive ‘client’. Exacerbating 
this problem are the obvious stakes implicated by the outcome of the review process. It 
is entirely unrealistic to expect the representative to ignore the possibility that 
effectively performing the representation duties could result in an enemy operative 
being returned to the battle-space. The obvious consequence of such an outcome would 
include the death or injury of other members of U.S. or coalition armed forces. It is far 
more realistic to assume that these considerations will inevitably compromise the 
representative zeal essential to effectuate the purpose of the quasi-adversarial process. 
It is unlikely the Department of Defense was ignorant to this risk when it 
developed the detainee review process for both Guantanamo and Parwan. Instead, it is 
far more likely that the decision to rely on lay representatives was based on three 
                                                 
182 See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 289 (1981) (holding that the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury 
that “[t]he defendant is not compelled to testify and the fact that he does not cannot be used as an 
inference of guilt and should not prejudice him in any way” was fundamental error and that a defendant 
had a right to such an instruction under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments). The Court noted that 
while “[n]o judge can prevent jurors from speculating about why a defendant stands mute in the face of a 
criminal accusation,” a judge must, at the defendant’s request, “use the unique power of the jury 
instruction to reduce that speculation to a minimum” and that “the failure to limit the jurors” speculation 
on the meaning of . . . [a defendant’s] silence, when the defendant makes a timely request that a 
prophylactic instruction be given, exacts an impermissible toll on the full and free exercise of the privilege 
[against self-incrimination].” Id. at 303, 305. 
 
183 See David J.R. Frakt, The Myth of Divided Loyalties: Defending Detainees and the Constitution in the 
Guantanamo Military Commissions, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 545, 554 (2011) (“Contrary to what some non-
lawyers might believe, there is no conflict of interest for a military lawyer in representing an individual 
whose interests may be, in some sense, adverse to the U.S. government or the U.S. military, at least as 
defined by the rules of professional responsibility”). Obviously, legal training emphasizes the nature of 
zealous representation, even of a client one might find personally abhorrent; unfortunately, lay 
representatives are not steeped in the sort of training and ethos as lawyers are, potentially resulting in the 
internal conflict described above. 
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primary considerations. First, analogy to the GPW Article 5 process almost certainly 
influenced this decision. As noted earlier, on the surface the objective of both the CSRTs 
and the Article 5 are analogous. Accordingly, it is somewhat logical that those 
responsible for developing the CSRT process would adopt the Article 5 model. 
However, as was also explained earlier, because analogy between the POW and the 
unprivileged belligerent is limited, this assumption cannot justify a wholesale 
importation of Article 5 process for the unlawful belligerent detention determination. 
Second, it is likely that reliance on lay representatives was based in part on the 
assumption that tactical and technical proficiency is the sine qua non of effective 
representation. This assumption is supported by the efforts devoted to training these 
representatives.184  This is a flawed assumption. Effective representation of individuals 
accused of conduct so contrary to the interests of the state that it warrants incarceration 
– either punitive or preventive – requires more than tactical or technical proficiency in 
the process established to make the detention determination. The true sine qua non is the 
far more intangible element of zealousness. As noted earlier, this clearly forms the 
foundation of the Supreme Court’s right to counsel jurisprudence, and is central to the 
ethical obligation of lawyers. To suggest that expertise in the process alone renders 
representation of such an individual truly effective is inconsistent with this American 
representation tradition.185 
Of course, it is virtually impossible to prove this premise with anything close to 
empirical certitude. However, several considerations provide inferential support. First, 
consider the analogy to the soldier. Like the lawyer, tactical and technical proficiency is 
essential to the effectiveness of the soldier. However, military leaders understand 
intuitively that this is not the key element in producing a truly effective soldier, an 
individual who has been transformed from ‘civilian’ into ‘soldier’. This transformation 
involves far more than the development of tactical and technical proficiency; it involves 
                                                 
184 See Bovarnick, supra note 98, at 20 n. 82, 30 (discussing the initial training and periodic refresher 
training requirements of board members, recorders, and personal representatives). 
 
185 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (discussing the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel and holding that “a fair trial is one in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to 
an impartial tribunal for resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding.” Further, the Court 
reinforced the notion that access to legal representation “plays a crucial role in the adversarial system 
embodied in the Sixth Amendment, since access to counsel’s skill and knowledge is necessary to accord 
defendants the ‘ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution’ to which they are entitled”) 
(citation omitted). 
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inculcating the recruit with the warrior ethos and the value set that defines military 
service. This is a major component not only of initial training, but also of a soldier’s 
entire professional development. This is what accounts for the transformation from 
individual to member of a team committed to mission accomplishment. Soldiers are 
immersed in a culture of duty, loyalty, selfless service, and the sense of pride in being 
part of an organization that places mission accomplishment above self-interest.186 
Without that intangible element, the transformation is fundamentally incomplete. 
This analogy is indeed ironic in the context of the detainee representation 
process. The Department of Defense has essentially adopted an approach to this process 
that is inconsistent with its own understanding of the relationship between tactical and 
technical proficiency and professional ethos. Taking the analogy to its logical 
conclusion, reliance on lay advocates to represent suspected unprivileged enemy 
belligerents in the detention review process is analogous to reliance on an experienced 
hunter to perform the mission of an infantryman on the field of battle. Such a 
suggestion is of course ludicrous. However, it reveals the significance of professional 
ethos in relation to the execution of the challenging duty entrusted to the warrior. In the 
adversarial system, it is the advocate who serves as the warrior; and in that system the 
significance of professional ethos is no less profound. 
The third consideration that likely contributed to the lay representative approach 
is feasibility. A simplistic assessment of the cost/benefit equation might suggest that 
providing lay representation for suspected unlawful enemy belligerents is logical. The 
numbers and availability of non-legal military officers capable of being trained in 
representation duties is obviously more extensive than available military legal 
officers.187 Judge Advocates are a finite resource already involved in the support of 
                                                 
186 The culture is reflected in the core values of each service: while each service phrases its values slightly 
differently, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps all list some form of honor/integrity, selfless 
service, courage, and committing to excellence as core values. See generally U.S. Army, Living the Army 
Values, available at http://www.goarmy.com/soldier-life/being-a-soldier/living-the-army-values.html 
(last visited Sept. 9, 2011); U.S. Navy, Honor, Courage, Commitment, available at 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/navy_legacy_hr.asp?id=193 (last visited Sept. 9, 2011); U.S. Air Force, Our 
Values, available at http://www.airforce.com/learn-about/our-values/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2011); U.S. 
Marine Corps, Core Values, available at 
http://www.marines.com/main/index/making_marines/culture/traditions/core_values (last visited Sept. 9, 
2011). 
 
187 For example, as of 2009, there were 88,093 officers in the United States Army; of those, only about 2000 
individuals were full-time judge-advocates. Compare United States Armed Forces, Wikipedia (Jan. 6, 2012 at 
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military operations in unprecedented numbers. Providing a military lawyer for every 
captive facing indefinite detention hearing would create an additional burden on this 
finite pool of military lawyers. If the focal point of satisfying the representation 
requirement is technical aptitude, then the availability of an alternate source of officers 
to perform these duties would seem an attractive and logical alternative.  
Even assuming arguendo that technical competence is the appropriate focal point 
of cost/benefit analysis (an assumption challenged throughout this article) there are 
three other considerations that undermine a balance that favors continuation of the lay 
representative approach. First, the second order benefit to the habeas litigation process. 
Second, the overall enhanced credibility of the U.S. detention process. Third, enhanced 
efficiency in the process to determine who should continue to be detained. Each of these 
considerations favor representation by individuals imbued with the legal professional 
ethos. This conclusion is based on the assumption that legal representation would 
improve the quality of the detention review process by producing more comprehensive 
review tribunal records and mitigating the risk of detaining individuals without 
legitimate cause, a conclusion that apparently motivated Congress to impose this 
requirement on the Department of Defense.188  
                                                                                                                                                             
11:59 PM), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Armed_Forces#Personnel_in_each_service 
(reporting the number of officers in the Army in 2009) (last visited Jan. 8, 2012) with  Judge-Advocate 
General’s Corps, United States Army, WIKIPEDIA (Sept. 19, 2011, 4:47 PM), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judge_Advocate_General%27s_Corps,_United_States_Army (last visited 
Jan. 8, 2012) (reporting the number of JAG officers). 
 
188 Just as appointed JAG defense attorneys pointed out flaws with the military commission trials under 
the 2006 MCA, so would legal counsel be able to note the flaws of the CSRT process and move to 
challenge them. See Frakt, supra note 104, at 563 (“The efforts of both military defense counsel and 
prosecutors highlighted the many flaws of the MCA of 2006. This, in turn, led to dramatic improvements 
in the MCA of 2009”). Frakt, himself a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Air Force Reserve JAG Corps, also 
notes that in his experience, JAG attorneys do not feel as if representing detainees is harming their 
country; rather, many see it as a way to defend the Constitution and American values:  
The ultimate allegiance of the military lawyer is to the U.S. Constitution. Military 
defenders not only saw no conflict with their oath to defend the Constitution, but viewed 
the representation of detainees as being in total harmony with this duty. Military lawyers 
are also deeply committed to the laws of war and the rule of law generally. The 
substantive law of the military commission, as well as the rules and procedures 
developed by the Pentagon, were inconsistent with the laws of war and violated basic 
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The first of these considerations – the impact on the habeas litigation process – 
could produce two important benefits. First, it is logical to assume that representation 
by a skilled lawyer will enhance the review tribunal quasi-adversarial process.  These 
improvements could include exposing evidentiary deficiencies, identifying and 
presenting otherwise overlooked probative evidence, subjecting presented evidence to 
more robust testing, and more effectively summarizing the evidence and legal 
standards applicable to the decision-maker. This enhancement will in turn result in a 
more comprehensive record of the status determination process. If and when these 
determinations are subject to federal judicial review, the enhanced quality of these 
records should logically result in enhanced reliance on the detainability determination 
by reviewing courts.189 The importance of this potential benefit is highlighted by the 
government’s habeas litigation track record to date. After Boumediene opened the door 
to consideration of evidentiary insufficiency, this factor became a major focal point of 
reviewing courts.190 Improved representation should mitigate this problem. Of course, 
                                                                                                                                                             
principles of due process. Many JAGs viewed the entire legal regime as an affront to 
military justice and to basic American values and were eager to reveal its shortcomings. 
Id. at 558.  
 
189 See id. at 555 (noting that CSRT findings “were largely discounted by defense attorneys  . . . [as] [t]he 
Tribunals were viewed as unfair and deeply flawed”); Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 850 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(rejecting the Government’s contention that “it can prevail by submitting documents that read as if they 
were indictments or civil complaints, and that simply assert as facts the elements required to prove that a 
detainee falls within the definition of enemy combatant” and requiring the government to demonstrate 
the reliability of its evidence). 
 
190 See WITTES, supra note 49, at 77–80. Two of the major evidentiary issues are hearsay and so-called 
“mosaic evidence” – primarily circumstantial evidence that the Government claims should be considered 
as a whole, as opposed to judicial consideration of each individual piece of evidence by itself. With 
regard to hearsay:  
[b]oth government and habeas counsel are also pushing the appeals courts to redirect the 
lower court concerning the use of hearsay evidence, with a particular focus on the 
admissibility of and weight to be accorded such evidence . . . In Al Adahi, the government 
argues that Judge Kessler flyspecked its evidence way too closely, looking at each piece 
of evidence individually and applying scrutiny to it that, “far from acknowledging the 
realities of the wartime military setting and the weight and sensitivity of the 
government’s interests. . . [applied a] heightened standard of proof for the government.” 
In one instance, the government argues, Judge Kessler “searched for reasons, including 
mistaken reasons, to discredit the government’s witness, and refused on legally 
erroneous grounds to even consider the evidence that corroborated the witness’s 
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the value of this benefit is at this point in time restricted to the Guantanamo CSRTs. 
Whether habeas review will ultimately be extended to other detention venues like 
Afghanistan is yet to be determined conclusively.191  This improved process could, 
however, reduce the risk of such extension in the future by providing important indicia 
of credibility to the existing Executive branch approach to assessing detainability. 
Even assuming habeas review is never extended beyond Guantanamo detainees, 
improving the quality of other detention review proceedings will enhance the 
credibility of the overall detention process for unprivileged belligerents. Although the 
primary focal point of criticism of the U.S. detention practices since September 11th has 
been maltreatment of detainees (an issue that arose early in the war on terror and is 
now widely considered to have been mooted by U.S. recognition of a universal humane 
treatment obligation for all detainees), an important an underlying criticism has always 
been the prima facie illegitimacy of detention outside the framework of the Geneva 
Prisoner of War and Civilian Conventions.192  While there is substantial dispute on the 
                                                                                                                                                             
statements.” The proper approach, it urges the D.C. Circuit, “is to recognize the distinct 
nature of the intelligence information and other sources on which the military must rely, 
and to accord appropriate deference to the inferences that expert military personnel draw 
from such material based on the insights they derive from their military operations and 
experience. 
Id. at 77 (citations omitted). 
 
191 Although the District of Columbia District Court extended habeas review to a detainee held in Bagram 
who had been initially captured outside of Afghanistan, this decision was subsequently reversed by the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that district 
court lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioners’ writs of habeas corpus, as petitioners were held outside 
the de jure sovereignty of the United States and thus previous statutory invocations of the Article I, 
Section 9 Suspension Clause served to deny the district court jurisdiction over petitioners’ habeas 
petitions). This indicates it is unlikely the courts will extend habeas review beyond the limits of 
Guantanamo detainees. However, as with so many other issue related to detentions of unprivileged 
belligerents in the war on terror, it is truly impossible to predict how this issue will ultimately evolve. 
 
192 See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Preventive Detention: Prisoners, Suspected Terrorists and Permanent Emergency, 25 T. 
JEFFERSON L. REV. 389, 389 (2003). Lobel argues that detaining against future conduct rather than 
punished past offenses “threatens to undermine fundamental principles of both constitutional law and 
international law which prohibit certain government action based on mere suspicion or perceived threat”  
and is especially concerned about such detention being employed against U.S. citizens, and draws strong 
historical parallels when arguing that  
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[t]he use of indefinite administrative detention against citizens for security purposes 
represents a profound shift in our constitutional order which generally prohibits 
detaining people for substantial period without charging them with a crime. Despite the 
Constitution's proscriptions, the American government has responded to perceived or 
contrived security threats in the past by detaining or authorizing the detention of 
disfavored groups: anarchist aliens during the Palmer Raids after WWI, Japanese 
Americans during WWII, suspected communists during the Cold War, and now 
suspected terrorists labeled as “enemy combatants.” 
Id. at 397–98. See also Alec Walen, Criminalizing Statements of Terrorist Intent; How to Understand the Law 
Governing Terrorist Threats, and Why It should be Used Instead of Long-Term Preventive Detention, 101 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803, 810–11.  Walen adopts a moral or principled approach, rather than pragmatic 
approach, to the issue of long-term detention, asserting that  
one might respond to the claim that the government can prosecute suspected terrorists 
(STs) who threaten to commit terrorist acts by saying that that option, helpful as it might 
be, is not as helpful as also having the option of subjecting STs to long-term preventive 
detention (LTPD). I have argued at length against that position, and in favor of the view 
that respect for the dignity of autonomous individuals requires the government to release 
and police, after (at most) a short period of preventive detention, its own citizens who it 
cannot convict of a crime for which long-term punitive detention is a fitting punishment. 
Id. (citations omitted). Walen’s position revolves around the dichotomy of short-term detention and 
observation followed by prosecution or release and further observation, and in all instances, long-term 
detention is inappropriate unless and until the suspect is actually convicted of a crime. Walen makes 
stark distinctions between what he considers to be justifiable short-term detention (which, if applied 
against a citizen may arguably still violate their constitutional right to liberty) and long-term detention, 
which is only justifiable in a punitive context or very specific preventive contexts; however, at no time 
does he believe that long-term preventive detention for alleged terrorist operatives is appropriate for 
future intelligence-gathering purposes: 
Those who can be detained fall into two basic categories: those subject to punitive 
detention and those subject to preventive detention. Punitive detention respects 
autonomy because it is based on a person's autonomous choice to commit a crime. Those 
subject to preventive detention can be detained in the short-term for the sake of security 
because even innocent people can be expected to make small sacrifices for the sake of the 
greater welfare. People may be subject to long-term preventive detention (“LTPD”), 
however, only if they fall into one of four categories: (1) they lack the normal 
autonomous capacity to govern their own choices; (2) they have, in virtue of one or more 
criminal convictions, lost their right to be treated as autonomous and accountable; (3) 
they have an independent duty to avoid contact with others because such contact would 
be impermissibly harmful (e.g., those with contagious and deadly diseases), and LTPD 
simply reinforces this duty; or (4) they are incapable of being adequately policed and 
held accountable for their choices. Importantly, traditional combatants and some 
suspected members of groups like al-Qaeda fall under this last category, and thus their 
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detention can be accounted for in this AR Model. If, however, a given suspected member 
of a group like al-Qaeda--a suspected terrorist (“ST”)--does not fall under this last 
category (or any of the former three categories), then he must be released and policed like 
any criminal defendant who is acquitted at trial if he is not tried and convicted of a crime. 
Alec Walen, Transcending, But Not Abandoning, the Combatant-Civilian Distinction: A Case Study, 63 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 1149, 1163–64 (2011). In considering his point, Walen discusses the al-Marri case, in which the 
Fourth Circuit’s holding was ultimately vacated as moot: al-Marri, a Qatari citizen arrested in December 
2001 in connection to the 9/11 attacks, was criminally charged with possessing fraudulent credit card 
numbers in 2002 and with making false statements to the FBI in 2003; pleading not guilty, al-Marri was 
set for trial until President Bush determined that al-Marri was an enemy combatant associated with al 
Qaeda and transferred to military detention in South Carolina. See al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 
(2009), vacating as moot Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 214, 219 (4th Cir. 2008), Al-Marri filed for habeas 
relief and while the Fourth Circuit held that he could be detained as an enemy combatant, it also held that 
he had not been provided with sufficient process to challenge that determination; the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari but vacated the Fourth Circuit’s decision when the Government opted to release al-
Marri from military detention and prosecute him in federal district court. See al-Marri, 555 U.S. at 1220. 
Walen laments the Government’s dismissal, because the Court had never addressed a citizen or legal 
resident alien being arrested and detained on U.S. soil, far from any battlefield: 
The Court had already determined, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, that U.S. citizens can be held as 
enemy combatants. But that case based its holding at least in part on the assumption (to 
be verified by a fair hearing) that Hamdi was captured while fighting with the Taliban in 
what was a traditional international armed conflict, a conflict in which the United States 
was and remains actively engaged. This left the question whether a U.S. citizen or a 
legally resident alien, who was not captured on a traditional battlefield and had not even 
taken up arms against the United States on behalf of an enemy nation, could likewise be 
detained as an enemy combatant. 
Transcending, supra note 197, at 1153. Walen’s argument would that such a determination, made far from 
the battlefield and in a context where civilian law enforcement was operating effectively and could 
capably dispose of the issue, “threatens to strip the protections of the criminal law and its highly 
protective due process framework from people who any civil libertarian would think deserve to benefit 
from them.” Id. at 1159. In a similar vein, other scholars asserted that generational detention without 
charge, under any justification, is inconsistent with American constitutional jurisprudence and 
international human rights law. As early as 2002, one Canadian scholar considered the implications to 
American constitutional law:   
The Pentagon's top lawyer has gone further, to suggest that even terror suspects who are 
tried and acquitted may be held in indefinite detention. A senior aide to former president 
George Bush Sr. is worried: “Would I be comfortable keeping them in Guantanamo for 20 
years on the theory that the war on terrorism is still going on? Probably not.” I would 
remove the “probably”. No principle of international or American law can be invoked to 
permit indefinite preventive detention. 
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international legal basis for such detentions, one thing is certain: no humanitarian law 
treaty provides express authority to detain captives based on this categorization. This 
has led many critics of U.S. detention practices to condemn the legal rationale for 
preventive detentions. 
For purposes of U.S. practice, it is clear that the authority to detain unprivileged 
enemy belligerents has been legally sanctioned by both the Supreme Court and 
Congress (originally by implication and now expressly pursuant to the NDAA) as an 
exercise of national war powers.193 It is equally clear, however, that this legal basis is 
                                                                                                                                                             
Stephen J. Toope, Fallout from ‘9-11’: Will a Secure Culture Undermine Human Rights?, 65 SASK. L. REV. 281, 
289 (2002). In the ten years that have passed since 9/11, America and the world continue to struggle with 
the legal effects of the GWOT and with the effect of detaining persons in an armed conflict that 
transcends borders and traditional battlefields. While criticism began at the same time the original 
detention plan was implemented, today the concerns seem to stem from the duality of looking back a 
decade and looking into the future indefinitely. Critics of long-term detention also focus on the relative 
inefficiency of trials by military commission—a handful charged and even fewer convicted and 
sentenced—despite the immense public. A common theme in modern criticism is that  
law of war detention is not an alternative to prosecution—the central focus of both POW 
detention and civilian detention for security reasons under the Fourth Geneva 
Convention is not criminal prosecution but protective and preventive detention.  
Laurie R. Blank, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Stretching Law of War Detention Too Far, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 
1169, 1189 (2011). Taken a step further, the argument against indefinite detention is becoming and will 
remain that “suggest[ing] that the United States can either prosecute detainees or hold them in indefinite 
detention is equivalent to suggesting that detention is another form of punishment.” Id. On another level, 
even the federal courts most sympathetic to the Government’s national security concerns are critical of 
the potential indefinite detention scheme. Considering generational detention at facilities in Afghanistan 
and detainees’ inability to challenge such detention using habeas, judge John Bates wrote: 
It is one thing to detain those captured on the surrounding battlefield at a place like 
Bagram, which respondents correctly maintain is in a theater of war. It is quite another 
thing to apprehend people in foreign countries—far from any Afghan battlefield—and 
then bring them to a theater of war, where the Constitution arguably may not reach. Such 
rendition resurrects the same specter of limitless Executive power the Supreme Court 
sought to guard against in Boumediene—the concern that the Executive could move 
detainees physically beyond the reach of the Constitution and detain them indefinitely. 
Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 220 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
 
193 See, e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub.L. 104-70, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001) 
(authorizing the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks . . . 
in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, 
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most robust in relation to individuals designated as unprivileged belligerents as the 
result of their participation in combat operations against U.S. or coalition military 
forces.194 The definition of unprivileged belligerent (originally unlawful enemy 
combatant) has, however, never been restricted to such individuals. Instead, from the 
inception of the war on terror it has included individuals who associated with al Qaeda 
or who provide support (qualified at various times as material or substantial) to 
belligerent forces or to international terrorist groups. This expansive definition of a 
detainable captive has undoubtedly contributed to the overall criticism leveled at the 
United States. 
Providing captives with assistance of counsel during their detention hearings 
will obviously not impact the scope of asserted detention authority. However, assuming 
counsel will enhance the quality of representation – an assumption at the core of this 
article – it will mitigate the over-breadth inherent in the current definition of 
unprivileged belligerents subject to preventive detention. Perhaps more importantly, 
this mitigating effect will likely bear an inverse relationship to the perceived legitimacy 
of the different categories of detainable unprivileged belligerent. Individuals captured 
on what is best described as a traditional field of battle after having engaged in 
hostilities against U.S. or coalition forces – the type of individual most analogous to a 
traditional enemy prisoner of war and therefore most justifiably subjected to wartime 
preventive detention195 – would be unlikely to garner much benefit from assistance of 
                                                                                                                                                             
organizations or persons”; by implication, “all necessary force” includes the detaining persons believed to 
be planning or aiding in past or future terror attacks against the United States).  
 
194 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004), In her plurality opinion, Justice O’Connor recognized that 
both Hamdi and the Government 
agree that initial captures on the battlefield need not receive the process we have 
discussed here [i.e. the right to challenge detention]; that process is due only when the 
determination is made to continue to hold those who have been seized.  
Id.  
195 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) (“Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as 
prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and 
detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which 
render their belligerency unlawful”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518, 521 (2004) (holding that 
detention of “individuals falling into the limited category [defined by the AUMF], for the duration of the 
particular conflict in which they were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to 
be an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress has authorized the President to use” and 
that “the United States may detain, for the duration of these hostilities, individuals legitimately 
determined to be Taliban combatants.” So long as American forces are engaged in combat in Afghanistan, 
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counsel. In contrast, captives alleged to be subject to preventive detention as the result 
of a tenuous association with al Qaeda or for providing support to belligerent forces or 
terrorist operations – the aspect of the unprivileged belligerent definition most 
attenuated from the traditional enemy prisoner of war definition and therefore most 
susceptible to criticism – would garner the most benefit from assistance of counsel. The 
weight of evidence, credibility of witnesses and statements, and inferences derived 
from circumstantial evidence is most critical in relation to these captives, all aspects of 
the detention review process that implicate the core competency of effective legal 
representation.196 
 The third potential benefit that would likely flow from provision of counsel to 
captives facing preventive detention would be a more efficient culling of justified 
versus unjustified detentions. Because this will serve the interests of captives and the 
military, this benefit may in fact be the most significant. It is utterly false to assume that 
the military benefits from an overly broad swath of detention authority. To the contrary, 
detaining individuals without legitimate justification consumes limited resources 
unnecessarily, detracts from the allocation of effort focused on individuals legitimately 
subject to detention, alienates local populations, and undermines the overall credibility 
of the detention operation. However, it is difficult to ignore the reality that soldiers at 
the point of capture have an incentive to err on the side of caution and initially detain 
individuals even when the justification is uncertain. At this point in the detention 
process, soldiers lack the clarity of careful evidentiary assessments and lack the time 
and space to consider the totality of the circumstances related to their decision. As a 
result, the military itself has a strong interest in an efficient yet effective process to cull 
from the group of captive subjected to long-term preventive detention individuals 
whose initial detention is determined to have been unjustified (a consideration 
obviously recognized by Congress when it exempted point-of-capture detention 
decisions from the legal representation provision of the NDAA). 
 Enhancing the quality of the fact-finding and review process would contribute to 
a more efficient allocation of detention resources and mitigate the very real risk of 
unjustified detentions. Assuming provision of counsel for detainees would provide 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Court held that if the United States proves that the person was “’engaged in an armed conflict against 
the United States’ . . . [the] detentions [would be] part of the exercise of ‘necessary and appropriate force’ . 
. . authorized by the AUMF”). 
 
196 This consideration may justify a limited provision of counsel, triggered only when a captive is 
subjected to detention for conduct that did not occur in the context of combat operations.  
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such an enhancement, the benefit of a more effective continued detention determination 
would clearly be within the interest of U.S. forces. The more complex  the status 
determination, the more significant this benefit becomes. This provides a rational basis 
to distinguish between a true GPW Article 5 tribunal process and detention review 
proceedings related to unprivileged belligerents. As discussed above, determining those 
captives who should be detained by virtue of their status as unprivileged belligerents in 
the context of the war on terror is far more complex than analogous determinations in 
the context of an armed conflict against a traditional state armed force. This provides a 
logical explanation for why providing assistance of counsel for unprivileged 
belligerents does not necessitate an analogous extension of this protection to suspected 
POWs brought before an Article 5 tribunal.  
 All of these potential benefits are of course only one aspect of the decision-
making equation. Any extension of legal representation for wartime detention 
determination must account for the costs of such provision. These costs fall into three 
broad categories. First, the resource allocation cost, or more specifically the burden 
imposed on the military legal community to allocate the manpower to satisfy this 
requirement. Second, the transaction cost produced by injecting legal representation for 
detainees at status determination proceedings - the adversarial instincts of lawyers will 
almost inevitably influence the nature of these proceedings, making them potentially 
more cumbersome and complex. Finally, the precedential cost of providing counsel as a 
matter of policy absent a clear legal obligation to do so. No matter how vigorously the 
government emphasizes the gratuitous nature of such a policy (which should be a 
central aspect of implementing the NDAA mandate), future detention operations would 
almost certainly be impacted by a perceived need to replicate the policy, even in 
situations without analogous justification. It is to these costs that this article will now 
turn. 
Part V: But is it Feasible? 
 Congress obviously concluded that none of these concerns justified the 
continuation of the pure lay representative model.  However, this does not render them 
irrelevant.  Instead, they will almost certainly influence the definition of the long-term 
trigger, and should be at least considered in order to place this development into wider 
strategic and operational context.   
a. Added Complexity.   
 Making a review process more complex as a result of more effective 
representation may be inevitable.  However, this cost will be offset by the benefit of this 
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complexity: improved accuracy.  Accuracy is certainly the ultimate objective of any 
detention review process, for it not only protects the individual captive from unjustified 
deprivation of liberty, but also protects the detaining power from releasing captives 
who should be subjected to continued detention.  Compromising accuracy in the 
interest of efficiency is simply not defensible, especially when the consequence of 
erroneous decisions is as profound as that associated with the wartime preventive 
detention process. 
b. Precedential Impact? 
 The risk that providing legal representation to individuals subjected to wartime 
preventive detention will be leveraged in future conflicts to press for extending this 
protection to more traditional enemy captives is a much more significant concern.  Since 
the end of World War II, there has been a steady and increasing pressure to extend 
human rights principles to the context of armed conflict.197  During this same period, it 
has also become commonplace for U.S. (and other) armed forces to supplement with 
                                                 
197 See Geoffrey S, Corn, Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of Applying Human Rights 
Norms to Armed Conflict, 1 J. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. STUD. 52, 57, 59–61 (2010) (attributing this pressure, in 
part, to the decrease in long-term military operations in the increase of so-called “peace operations,” 
referring specifically to  
military operations that did not involve sustained armed hostilities and therefore were 
almost universally considered as failing outside the LOAC regulatory framework. One 
aspect of these operations was that while participating armed forces were always 
prepared to engage in combat like hostilities, use of force was normally restricted to 
response to actual or imminent threat. As a result, the operational legal focus tended 
more towards issues related to interacting with and treatment of the local civilian 
population than with the application of combat power in a manner analogous to such 
application during armed conflict. 
Id. at 60 (citations omitted). Other law of war scholars have observed that  
[f]rom an empirical perspective . . . there has been a convergence between the 
international humanitarian law detention review standards and processes that one 
would find in international armed conflict, and the human rights-oriented detention 
review standards and processes that one would find in domestic or even international 
criminal law proceedings. This convergence has been incremental, and responsive in 
large part to international politics and litigation in U.S. courts. This convergence is more 
than a question of politics and judicial decisions on the reach of executive power – treaty 
and customary international law provide little detail as to what the standards and 
processes for detention review are, and therefore allow states a significant degree of 
latitude in fashioning their own measures. 
Prescott, supra note 98, at 17. 
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policy the range of individual protections required by law during military operations.  
The combination of these two factors – the ever increasing emphasis on protecting 
individual human rights during military operations and the practice of implementing 
protections often not required by law – has rendered the line between law and policy 
increasingly blurred. 
 Military practitioners are cognizant of this risk, and as a result it is almost 
inevitable that it will influence assessments of the wisdom of adopting gratuitous 
human rights protections during armed conflict.  However, this risk does not 
sufficiently offset the potential benefits of providing legal representation as a matter of 
policy.  Instead, it necessitates a clear and constant emphasis that it is indeed policy, 
and not a sense of legal obligation, motivating this modification to the existing practice.   
 Unfortunately, Congress does not seem to have been cognizant of the importance 
of this emphasis.  The NDAA legal representation provision in no way indicates 
whether it was adopted as a matter of national policy or in order to satisfy a perceived 
international legal obligation.  Indeed, the precedential impact of this provision of the 
NDAA is almost certainly more uncertain because it took the form of a statute and not a 
Department of Defense policy.  Because of this, any implementing regulations should 
emphasize the gratuitous nature of this provision, and that it does not indicate the U.S. 
considers legal representation an international legal requirement.   
 c.  Resource Drain? 
 Another significant consideration related to providing legal representation 
during the preventive detention process is personnel impact on the military legal 
community.  Military lawyers, or JAGs, are a finite resource in any operational context.  
Furthermore, the emphasis on rule of law and legally compliant operations has 
imposed a greater demand on these lawyers today than ever before, a burden that will 
almost certainly become even more demanding in the future.  As a result, imposing an 
additional requirement on this finite pool of lawyers should not be done casually. 
 Because detainee representation duties are not currently assigned to JAGs, it is 
impossible to dispute the fact that this change in policy will impose a significant new 
responsibility on these military lawyers.  However, this responsibility will provide a 
valuable opportunity for these lawyers to engage in a function that hones core advocacy 
and operational competencies.  It may also be logical to leverage the already existing 
military trial defense services to assume this duty, perhaps with augmentation from 
reserve component activated on a rotational basis to represent detainees.  Like all 
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missions in the military, once it is prioritized there is simply no question it will be 
effectively accomplished. 
Conclusion 
 Indefinite preventive detention is an inevitable necessity of armed hostilities.  
Some see this as unfortunate, others as mission essential, and still others as wholly 
illegitimate.  These reactions, while understandable, simply do not diminish the reality 
that preventive detention will be a continued aspect of the U.S. struggle against 
international terrorism.  Like all wars before and those to come in the future, preventing 
captured belligerent operatives from returning to the fight is logical and necessary to 
achieve tactical, operational, and strategic success. 
 There is, however, another aspect of this preventive detention process that is 
equally undeniable: the unconventional nature of the struggle against terrorism and the 
operatives that form the ranks of this enemy.  This reality creates a risk of erroneous 
detention and unjustified long-term deprivation of liberty that is exponentially more 
significant than the risk associated with conventional or ‘traditional’ armed conflicts.  
This endangers not only the liberty interest of innocent individuals erroneously 
suspected of being agents of terrorists groups, but also the strategic interests of the 
United States by eroding the precious perception of legitimacy. 
 Providing legal representation to individuals brought before administrative 
detention review proceedings is an important aspect of mitigating this risk.  No process 
can guarantee 100% accuracy in the outcomes of these proceedings; however, providing 
extensive process without representatives devoted to the ethos of zealous 
representation seems remarkably hollow.  As American law students learn through the 
Sixth Amending jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, it is the zealous devotion to the 
client that effectuates the process erected to protect individuals from government 
accusation. 
 The recent inclusion of a military legal representation provision in the NDAA is 
an important development in this area.  While it is unclear why Congress included this 
provision, it nonetheless reflects a judgment that the current lay-representation 
approach derived from the Prisoner of War Convention Article 5 Tribunal process is 
insufficient to address the interests of war on terror detainees.  How this provision will 
be implemented is yet to be seen, but perhaps the Department of Defense should 
embrace the logic of entrusting lawyers with this responsibility early in the detention 
review process.  While the gratuitous nature of this protection should absolutely be 
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emphasized, the potential benefits that will flow from this change sufficiently outweigh 
the costs sufficiently and warrant abandoning the current approach.   
